Tuesday, April 22, 2014


San Diego California DUI Attorneys - Navarette v. California says cops can pull over an identified vehicle upon report of dangerously being run off the road

San Diego California DUI Lawyers suggest cops can pull over just about any one in any identified vehicle based on just about any 911 call.  California DUI arrests were just made easier, San Diego drunk driving criminal defense attorneys regretfully report this SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES case.

This case does NOT allow anonymous callers to report only a "possible drunk driver" without more facts.

The more facts here include "specific" bad driving conduct - "running a vehicle off the road."  That's a "dangerous" driving act.

An anonymous caller still can not just call in "a minor traffic infraction."  It's more than "a conclusory allegation of drunk driving or reckless driving."

The court says in a footnote the 911 caller was not really an anonymous tip.  The identity of the caller was known but was treated as anonymous without objection.

This was a specific "close case."  Barebones tips remain unreliable.

This opinion does not seem much different than People v. Wells  which requires the tip "should indicate the caller had actually witnessed a contemporaneous traffic violation that compels an immediate stop, rather than merely speculating or surmising unlawful activity."

Here's the whole opinion.


No. 12–9490. Argued January 21, 2014—Decided April 22, 2014

A California Highway Patrol officer stopped the pickup truck occupied by petitioners because it matched the description of a vehicle that a 911 caller had recently reported as having run her off the road. As he and a second officer approached the truck, they smelled marijuana.They searched the truck’s bed, found 30 pounds of marijuana, and arrested petitioners. Petitioners moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the traffic stop violated the Fourth Amendment. Their motion was denied, and they pleaded guilty to transporting marijuana. The California Court of Appeal affirmed, concluding that the officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigative stop.

Held: The traffic stop complied with the Fourth Amendment because,under the totality of the circumstances, the officer had reasonable suspicion that the truck’s driver was intoxicated. Pp. 3–11.

(a) The Fourth Amendment permits brief investigative stops when an officer has “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of . . . criminal activity.” United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411, 417–418. Reasonable suspicion takes into account “the totality of the circumstances,” id., at 417, and depends“upon both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability,” Alabama v. White, 496 U. S. 325, 330. An anonymous tip alone seldom demonstrates sufficient reliability, White, 496
S., at 329, but may do so under appropriate circumstances, id., at
327. Pp. 3–5.
The 911 call in this case bore adequate indicia of reliability for the officer to credit the caller’s account. By reporting that she had been run off the road by a specific vehicle, the caller necessarily claimed an eyewitness basis of knowledge. The apparently short time between the reported incident and the 911 call suggests that the
caller had little time to fabricate the report. And a reasonable officer could conclude that a false tipster would think twice before using the 911 system, which has several technological and regulatory features that safeguard against making false reports with immunity. Pp. 5–8.
Not only was the tip here reliable, but it also created reasonable suspicion of drunk driving. Running another car off the road suggests the sort of impairment that characterizes drunk driving. While that conduct might be explained by another cause such as driver distraction, reasonable suspicion “need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U. S. 266, 277. Finally,the officer’s failure to observe additional suspicious conduct during the short period that he followed the truck did not dispel the reasonable suspicion of drunk driving, and the officer was not required to surveil the truck for a longer period. Pp. 8–10.
THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
C. J., and KENNEDY, BREYER, and ALITO, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which GINSBURG, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined.
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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
No. 12–9490
[April 22, 2014]
JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
After a 911 caller reported that a vehicle had run her off the road, a police officer located the vehicle she identified during the call and executed a traffic stop. We hold that the stop complied with the Fourth Amendment because, under the totality of the circumstances, the officer had reasonable suspicion that the driver was intoxicated.
I On August 23, 2008, a Mendocino County 911 dispatch team for the California Highway Patrol (CHP) received a call from another CHP dispatcher in neighboring Humboldt County. The Humboldt County dispatcher relayed a tip from a 911 caller, which the Mendocino County team recorded as follows: “‘Showing southbound Highway 1 at mile marker 88, Silver Ford 150 pickup. Plate of 8-David94925. Ran the reporting party off the roadway and was last seen approximately five [minutes] ago.’ ” App. 36a. The Mendocino County team then broadcast that information to CHP officers at 3:47 p.m.A CHP officer heading northbound toward the reported vehicle responded to the broadcast. At 4:00 p.m., the
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officer passed the truck near mile marker 69. At about 4:05 p.m., after making a U-turn, he pulled the truck over.A second officer, who had separately responded to the broadcast, also arrived on the scene. As the two officers approached the truck, they smelled marijuana. A search of the truck bed revealed 30 pounds of marijuana. The officers arrested the driver, petitioner Lorenzo Prado Navarette, and the passenger, petitioner José PradoNavarette.
Petitioners moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the traffic stop violated the Fourth Amendment because the officer lacked reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Both the magistrate who presided over the suppression hearing and the Superior Court disagreed.1 Petitioners pleaded guilty to transporting marijuana and were sentenced to 90 days in jail plus three years of probation.
The California Court of Appeal affirmed, concluding that the officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigative stop. 2012 WL 4842651 (Oct. 12, 2012). The court reasoned that the content of the tip indicated that it came from an eyewitness victim of reckless driving, and that the officer’s corroboration of the truck’s description, location, and direction established that the tip was reliable enough to justify a traffic stop. Id., at *7. Finally, the court concluded that the caller reported driving that was sufficiently dangerous to merit an investigative stop without waiting for the officer to observe additional reckless driving himself. Id., at *9. The California Supreme Court
—————— 1 At the suppression hearing, counsel for petitioners did not dispute that the reporting party identified herself by name in the 911 call recording. Because neither the caller nor the Humboldt County dispatcher who received the call was present at the hearing, however, the prosecution did not introduce the recording into evidence. The prosecution proceeded to treat the tip as anonymous, and the lower courts followed suit. See 2012 WL 4842651, *6 (Cal. Ct. App., Oct. 12, 2012).
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denied review. We granted certiorari, 570 U. S. ___ (2013), and now affirm.
II The Fourth Amendment permits brief investigative stops—such as the traffic stop in this case—when a law enforcement officer has “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411, 417– 418 (1981); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 21–22 (1968). The “reasonable suspicion” necessary to justify such a stop “is dependent upon both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability.” Alabama v. White, 496 U. S. 325, 330 (1990). The standard takes into account “the totality of the circumstances—the whole picture.” Cortez, supra, at 417. Although a mere “‘hunch’” does not create reasonable suspicion, Terry, supra, at 27, the level of suspicion the standard requires is “considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence,” and “obviously less” than is necessary for probable cause, United States v. Sokolow, 490 U. S. 1, 7 (1989).
A These principles apply with full force to investigative stops based on information from anonymous tips. We have firmly rejected the argument “that reasonable cause for a[n investigative stop] can only be based on the officer’s personal observation, rather than on information supplied by another person.” Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143, 147 (1972). Of course, “an anonymous tip alone seldom demonstrates the informant’s basis of knowledge or veracity.” White, 496 U. S., at 329 (emphasis added). That is because “ordinary citizens generally do not provide extensive recitations of the basis of their everyday observations,” and an anonymous tipster’s veracity is “‘by hypoth4
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esis largely unknown, and unknowable.’” Ibid. But under appropriate circumstances, an anonymous tip can demonstrate “sufficient indicia of reliability to provide reasonable suspicion to make [an] investigatory stop.” Id., at 327.
Our decisions in Alabama v. White, 496 U. S. 325 (1990), and Florida v. J. L., 529 U. S. 266 (2000), are useful guides. In White, an anonymous tipster told the police that a woman would drive from a particular apartment building to a particular motel in a brown Plymouth station wagon with a broken right tail light. The tipster further asserted that the woman would be transporting cocaine.496 U. S., at 327. After confirming the innocent details,officers stopped the station wagon as it neared the motel and found cocaine in the vehicle. Id., at 331. We held that the officers’ corroboration of certain details made the anonymous tip sufficiently reliable to create reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. By accurately predicting future behavior, the tipster demonstrated “a special familiarity with respondent’s affairs,” which in turn implied that the tipster had “access to reliable information about that individual’s illegal activities.” Id., at 332. We also recognized that an informant who is proved to tell the truth about some things is more likely to tell the truth about other things, “including the claim that the object of the tip is engaged in criminal activity.” Id., at 331 (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213, 244 (1983)).
In J. L., by contrast, we determined that no reasonable suspicion arose from a bare-bones tip that a young black male in a plaid shirt standing at a bus stop was carrying a gun. 529 U. S., at 268. The tipster did not explain how he knew about the gun, nor did he suggest that he had any special familiarity with the young man’s affairs. Id., at
271. As a result, police had no basis for believing “that the tipster ha[d] knowledge of concealed criminal activity.” Id., at 272. Furthermore, the tip included no predictions of future behavior that could be corroborated to assess the
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tipster’s credibility. Id., at 271. We accordingly concluded that the tip was insufficiently reliable to justify a stop and frisk.
B The initial question in this case is whether the 911 call was sufficiently reliable to credit the allegation that petitioners’ truck “ran the [caller] off the roadway.” Even assuming for present purposes that the 911 call was anonymous, see n. 1, supra, we conclude that the call bore adequate indicia of reliability for the officer to credit the caller’s account. The officer was therefore justified in proceeding from the premise that the truck had, in fact, caused the caller’s car to be dangerously diverted from the highway.By reporting that she had been run off the road by a specific vehicle—a silver Ford F-150 pickup, license plate 8D94925—the caller necessarily claimed eyewitness knowledge of the alleged dangerous driving. That basis of knowledge lends significant support to the tip’s reliability.See Gates, supra, at 234 (“[An informant’s] explicit and detailed description of alleged wrongdoing, along with a statement that the event was observed firsthand, entitles his tip to greater weight than might otherwise be thecase”); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U. S. 410, 416 (1969) (a tip of illegal gambling is less reliable when “it is not alleged that the informant personally observed [the defendant] at work or that he had ever placed a bet with him”). This is in contrast to J. L., where the tip provided no basis for concluding that the tipster had actually seen the gun. 529 U. S., at 271. Even in White, where we upheld the stop, there was scant evidence that the tipster had actually observed cocaine in the station wagon. We called White a “‘close case’” because “[k]nowledge about a person’s future movements indicates some familiarity with that person’s affairs, but having such knowledge does not
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necessarily imply that the informant knows, in particular,whether that person is carrying hidden contraband.” 529
U. S., at 271. A driver’s claim that another vehicle ran her off the road, however, necessarily implies that the informant knows the other car was driven dangerously.
There is also reason to think that the 911 caller in this case was telling the truth. Police confirmed the truck’s location near mile marker 69 (roughly 19 highway miles south of the location reported in the 911 call) at 4:00 p.m.(roughly 18 minutes after the 911 call). That timeline of events suggests that the caller reported the incident soon after she was run off the road. That sort of contemporaneous report has long been treated as especially reliable. In evidence law, we generally credit the proposition that statements about an event and made soon after perceiving that event are especially trustworthy because “substantial contemporaneity of event and statement negate the likelihood of deliberate or conscious misrepresentation.” Advisory Committee’s Notes on Fed. Rule Evid. 803(1), 28
U. S. C. App., p. 371 (describing the rationale for the hearsay exception for “present sense impression[s]”). A similar rationale applies to a “statement relating to a startling event”—such as getting run off the road—“made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused.” Fed. Rule Evid. 803(2) (hearsay exception for “excited utterances”). Unsurprisingly, 911 calls that would otherwise be inadmissible hearsay have often been admitted on those grounds. See D. Binder, Hearsay Handbook §8.1, pp. 257–259 (4th ed. 2013–2014) (citing cases admitting 911 calls as present sense impressions); id., §9.1, at 274–275 (911 calls admitted as excited utterances). There was no indication that the tip in J. L. (or even in White) was contemporaneous with the observation of criminal activity or made under the stress of excitement caused by a startling event, but those considerations weigh in favor of the caller’s veracity here.
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Another indicator of veracity is the caller’s use of the 911 emergency system. See Brief for Respondent 40–41,44; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 16–18. A 911 call has some features that allow for identifying and tracing callers, and thus provide some safeguards against making false reports with immunity. See J. L., supra, at 276 (KENNEDY, J., concurring). As this case illustrates, see n. 1, supra, 911 calls can be recorded, which provides victims with an opportunity to identify the false tipster’s voice and subject him to prosecution, see, e.g., Cal. Penal Code Ann. §653x (West 2010) (makes “telephon[ing] the 911 emergency line with the intent to annoy or harass”punishable by imprisonment and fine); see also §148.3(2014 West Cum. Supp.) (prohibits falsely reporting “that an ‘emergency’ exists”); §148.5 (prohibits falsely reporting “that a felony or misdemeanor has been committed”). The 911 system also permits law enforcement to verify important information about the caller. In 1998, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) began to require cellular carriers to relay the caller’s phone number to 911 dispatchers. 47 CFR §20.18(d)(1) (2013) (FCC’s “Phase I enhanced 911 services” requirements). Beginning in 2001, carriers have been required to identify the caller’s geographic location with increasing specificity. §§20.18(e)–(h) (“Phase II enhanced 911 service” requirements). And although callers may ordinarily block call recipients from obtaining their identifying information, FCC regulations exempt 911 calls from that privilege. §§64.1601(b),(d)(4)(ii) (“911 emergency services” exemption from rule that, when a caller so requests, “a carrier may not reveal that caller’s number or name”). None of this is to suggest that tips in 911 calls are per se reliable. Given the foregoing technological and regulatory developments, however, a reasonable officer could conclude that a false tipster would think twice before using such a system. The caller’s use of the 911 system is therefore one of the relevant circum8
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stances that, taken together, justified the officer’s reliance on the information reported in the 911 call.
C Even a reliable tip will justify an investigative stop only if it creates reasonable suspicion that “criminal activity may be afoot.” Terry, 392 U. S., at 30. We must therefore determine whether the 911 caller’s report of being run off the roadway created reasonable suspicion of an ongoing crime such as drunk driving as opposed to an isolated episode of past recklessness. See Cortez, 449 U. S., at 417 (“An investigatory stop must be justified by some objective manifestation that the person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity”). We conclude that the behavior alleged by the 911 caller, “viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer,amount[s] to reasonable suspicion” of drunk driving. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U. S. 690, 696 (1996). The stop was therefore proper.2 Reasonable suspicion depends on “‘“the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reason- able and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.”’” Id., at
695. Under that commonsense approach, we can appropriately recognize certain driving behaviors as sound indicia of drunk driving. See, e.g., People v. Wells, 38 Cal. 4th 1078, 1081, 136 P. 3d 810, 811 (2006) (“‘weaving all over the roadway’”); State v. Prendergast, 103 Haw. 451, 452–453, 83 P. 3d 714, 715–716 (2004) (“cross[ing]over the center line” on a highway and “almost caus[ing]several head-on collisions”); State v. Golotta, 178 N. J. 205, 209, 837 A. 2d 359, 361 (2003) (driving “‘all over the road’” and “‘weaving back and forth’”); State v.
—————— 2 Because we conclude that the 911 call created reasonable suspicion of an ongoing crime, we need not address under what circumstances a stop is justified by the need to investigate completed criminal activity. Cf. United States v. Hensley, 469 U. S. 221, 229 (1985).
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Walshire, 634 N. W. 2d 625, 626 (Iowa 2001) (“driving inthe median”). Indeed, the accumulated experience of thousands of officers suggests that these sorts of erraticbehaviors are strongly correlated with drunk driving.See Nat. Highway Traffic Safety Admin., The Visual Detection of DWI Motorists 4–5 (Mar. 2010), online at http://nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/nti/pdf/808677.pdf (as visited Apr. 18, 2014, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file).Of course, not all traffic infractions imply intoxication.Unconfirmed reports of driving without a seatbelt or slightly over the speed limit, for example, are so tenuously connected to drunk driving that a stop on those grounds alone would be constitutionally suspect. But a reliable tip alleging the dangerous behaviors discussed above gener- ally would justify a traffic stop on suspicion of drunk driving.
The 911 caller in this case reported more than a minor traffic infraction and more than a conclusory allegation of drunk or reckless driving. Instead, she alleged a specific and dangerous result of the driver’s conduct: running another car off the highway. That conduct bears too great a resemblance to paradigmatic manifestations of drunk driving to be dismissed as an isolated example of recklessness. Running another vehicle off the road suggests lane positioning problems, decreased vigilance, impaired judgment, or some combination of those recognized drunk driving cues. See Visual Detection of DWI Motorists 4–5. And the experience of many officers suggests that a driver who almost strikes a vehicle or another object—the exact scenario that ordinarily causes “running [another vehicle] off the roadway”—is likely intoxicated. See id., at 5,8. As a result, we cannot say that the officer acted unreasonably under these circumstances in stopping a driver whose alleged conduct was a significant indicator of drunk driving.
Petitioners’ attempts to second-guess the officer’s rea10
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sonable suspicion of drunk driving are unavailing. It is true that the reported behavior might also be explained by, for example, a driver responding to “an unruly child or other distraction.” Brief for Petitioners 21. But we have consistently recognized that reasonable suspicion “need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U. S. 266, 277 (2002).
Nor did the absence of additional suspicious conduct,after the vehicle was first spotted by an officer, dispel the reasonable suspicion of drunk driving. Brief for Petitioners 23–24. It is hardly surprising that the appearance of a marked police car would inspire more careful driving for a time. Cf. Arvizu, supra, at 275 (“‘[s]lowing down after spotting a law enforcement vehicle’” does not dispel reasonable suspicion of criminal activity). Extended observation of an allegedly drunk driver might eventually dispel a reasonable suspicion of intoxication, but the 5-minute period in this case hardly sufficed in that regard. Of course, an officer who already has such a reasonable suspicion need not surveil a vehicle at length in order to personally observe suspicious driving. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S., at 147 (repudiating the argument that “reasonable cause for a[n investigative stop] can only be based on the officer’s personal observation”). Once reasonable suspicion of drunk driving arises, “[t]he reasonableness of the officer’s decision to stop a suspect does not turn on the availability of less intrusive investigatory techniques.” Sokolow, 490 U. S., at 11. This would be a particularly inappropriate context to depart from that settled rule, because allowing a drunk driver a second chance for dangerous conduct could have disastrous consequences.
III Like White, this is a “close case.” 496 U. S., at 332. As in that case, the indicia of the 911 caller’s reliability here
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are stronger than those in J. L., where we held that a bare-bones tip was unreliable. 529 U. S., at 271. Although the indicia present here are different from those we found sufficient in White, there is more than one way to demonstrate “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” Cortez, 449 U. S., at 417–418. Under the totality of the circumstances, we find the indicia of reliability in this case sufficient to provide the officer with reasonable suspicion that the driver of the reported vehicle had run another vehicle off the road. That made it reasonable under the circumstances for the officer to execute a traffic stop. We accordingly affirm.
It is so ordered.
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SCALIA, J., dissenting
No. 12–9490
[April 22, 2014]
The California Court of Appeal in this case relied on jurisprudence from the California Supreme Court (adopted as well by other courts) to the effect that “an anonymous and uncorroborated tip regarding a possibly intoxicated highway driver” provides without more the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify a stop. People v. Wells, 38 Cal. 4th l078, 1082, 136 P. 3d 810, 812, (2006). See also, e.g., United States v. Wheat, 278 F. 3d 722, 729–730 (CA8 2001); State v. Walshire, 634 N. W. 2d 625, 626–627, 630 (Iowa 2001). Today’s opinion does not explicitly adopt such a departure from our normal Fourth Amendment requirement that anonymous tips must be corroborated; it purports to adhere to our prior cases, such as Florida v.
J. L., 529 U. S. 266 (2000), and Alabama v. White, 496
U. S. 325 (1990). Be not deceived.
Law enforcement agencies follow closely our judgments on matters such as this, and they will identify at once our new rule: So long as the caller identifies where the car is, anonymous claims of a single instance of possibly careless or reckless driving, called in to 911, will support a traffic stop. This is not my concept, and I am sure would not be the Framers’, of a people secure from unreasonable searches and seizures. I would reverse the judgment of
SCALIA, J., dissenting
the Court of Appeal of California.
I The California Highway Patrol in this case knew nothing about the tipster on whose word—and that alone—they seized Lorenzo and José Prado Navarette. They did not know her name.1 They did not know her phone number or address. They did not even know where she called from (she may have dialed in from a neighboring county,App. 33a–34a). The tipster said the truck had “[run her] off the roadway,” id., at 36a, but the police had no reason to credit that charge and many reasons to doubt it, beginning with the peculiar fact that the accusation was anonymous. “[E]liminating accountability . . . is ordinarily the very purpose of anonymity.” McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U. S. 334, 385 (1995) (SCALIA, J., dissenting).The unnamed tipster “can lie with impunity,” J. L., supra, at 275 (KENNEDY, J., concurring). Anonymity is especially suspicious with respect to the call that is the subject of the present case. When does a victim complain to the police about an arguably criminal act (running the victim off the road) without giving his identity, so that he can accuse and testify when the culprit is caught?The question before us, the Court agrees, ante, at 8, is whether the “content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability,” White, 496 U. S., at 330, gave the officers reasonable suspicion that the driver of the truck (Lorenzo) was committing an ongoing crime. When the only source of the government’s information is an informant’s tip, we ask whether the tip bears sufficient “‘indicia of reliability,’” id., at 328, to establish “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular —————— 1 There was some indication below that the tipster was a woman. See App. 18a. Beyond that detail, we must, as the Court notes, ante, at 2,
n. 1, assume that the identity of the tipster was unknown.
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SCALIA, J., dissenting
person stopped of criminal activity,” United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411, 417–418 (1981).
The most extreme case, before this one, in which an anonymous tip was found to meet this standard was White, supra. There the reliability of the tip was established by the fact that it predicted the target’s behavior inthe finest detail—a detail that could be known only by someone familiar with the target’s business: She would, the tipster said, leave a particular apartment building, get into a brown Plymouth station wagon with a broken right tail light, and drive immediately to a particular motel. Id., at 327. Very few persons would have such intimate knowledge, and hence knowledge of the unobservable fact that the woman was carrying unlawful drugs was plausible. Id., at 332. Here the Court makes a big deal of the fact that the tipster was dead right about the fact that a silver Ford F-150 truck (license plate 8D94925) was traveling south on Highway 1 somewhere near mile marker 88. But everyone in the world who saw the car would have that knowledge, and anyone who wanted the car stopped would have to provide that information. Unlike the situation in White, that generally available knowledge in no way makes it plausible that the tipster saw the car run someone off the road.
The Court says, ante, at 5, that “[b]y reporting that she had been run off the road by a specific vehicle . . . the caller necessarily claimed eyewitness knowledge.” So what? The issue is not how she claimed to know, but whether what she claimed to know was true. The claim to “eyewitness knowledge” of being run off the road supports not at all its veracity; nor does the amazing, mystifying prediction (so far short of what existed in White) that the petitioners’ truck would be heading south on Highway 1.
The Court finds “reason to think” that the informant “was telling the truth” in the fact that police observation confirmed that the truck had been driving near the spot at
SCALIA, J., dissenting
which, and at the approximate time at which, the tipster alleged she had been run off the road. Ante, at 6. According to the Court, the statement therefore qualifies as a “‘present sense impression’” or “‘excited utterance,’” kinds of hearsay that the law deems categorically admissible given their low likelihood of reflecting “‘deliberate or conscious misrepresentation.’” Ibid. (quoting Advisory Committee’s Notes on Fed. Rule Evid. 803(1), 28 U. S. C.App., p. 371). So, the Court says, we can fairly supposethat the accusation was true.
No, we cannot. To begin with, it is questionable whether either the “present sense impression” or the “excited utterance” exception to the hearsay rule applies here. The classic “present sense impression” is the recounting of an event that is occurring before the declarant’s eyes, as the declarant is speaking (“I am watching the Hindenburg explode!”). See 2 K. Broun, McCormick on Evidence 362 (7th ed. 2013) (hereinafter McCormick). And the classic “excited utterance” is a statement elicited, almost involuntarily, by the shock of what the declarant is immediately witnessing (“My God, those people will be killed!”). See id., at 368–369. It is the immediacy that gives the statement some credibility; the declarant has not had time to dissemble or embellish. There is no such immediacy here. The declarant had time to observe the license number of the offending vehicle, 8D94925 (a difficult task if she was forced off the road and the vehicle was speeding away), to bring her car to a halt, to copy down the observed license number (presumably), and (if she was using her own cell phone) to dial a call to the police from the stopped car.Plenty of time to dissemble or embellish.
Moreover, even assuming that less than true immediacy will suffice for these hearsay exceptions to apply, the tipster’s statement would run into additional barriers to admissibility and acceptance. According to the very Advisory Committee’s Notes from which the Court quotes,
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SCALIA, J., dissenting
cases addressing an unidentified declarant’s present sense impression “indicate hesitancy in upholding the statement alone as sufficient” proof of the reported event. 28 U. S. C. App., at 371; see also 7 M. Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence 19–20 (7th ed. 2012). For excited utterances as well, the “knotty theoretical” question of statement-alone admissibility persists—seemingly even when the declarant is known. 2 McCormick 368. “Some courts . . . have taken the position that an excited utterance is admissible only if other proof is presented which supports a finding of fact that the exciting event did occur. The issue has not yetbeen resolved under the Federal Rules.” Id., at 367–368 (footnote omitted). It is even unsettled whether excited utterances of an unknown declarant are ever admissible. A leading treatise reports that “the courts have been reluctant to admit such statements, principally because of uncertainty that foundational requirements, including the impact of the event on the declarant, have been satisfied.” Id., at 372. In sum, it is unlikely that the law of evidencewould deem the mystery caller in this case “especially trustworthy,” ante, at 6.
Finally, and least tenably, the Court says that another“indicator of veracity” is the anonymous tipster’s mere“use of the 911 emergency system,” ante, at 7. Because, you see, recent “technological and regulatory developments” suggest that the identities of unnamed 911 callers are increasingly less likely to remain unknown. Ibid. Indeed, the systems are able to identify “the caller’s geographic location with increasing specificity.” Ibid. Amici disagree with this, see Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. 8–12, and the present case surely suggests that amici are right—since we know neither the identity of the tipster nor even the county from which the call was made. But assuming the Court is right about the ease of identifying 911 callers, it proves absolutely nothing in the present case unless the anonymous
SCALIA, J., dissenting
caller was aware of that fact. “It is the tipster’s belief in anonymity, not its reality, that will control his behavior.” Id., at 10 (emphasis added). There is no reason to believe that your average anonymous 911 tipster is aware that 911 callers are readily identifiable.2
II All that has been said up to now assumes that the anonymous caller made, at least in effect, an accusation of drunken driving. But in fact she did not. She said that the petitioners’ truck “‘[r]an [me] off the roadway.’” App. 36a. That neither asserts that the driver was drunk nor even raises the likelihood that the driver was drunk. The most it conveys is that the truck did some apparently nontypical thing that forced the tipster off the roadway,whether partly or fully, temporarily or permanently. Who really knows what (if anything) happened? The truck might have swerved to avoid an animal, a pothole, or a jaywalking pedestrian. But let us assume the worst of the many possibilities: that it was a careless, reckless, or even intentional maneuver that forced the tipster off the road. Lorenzo might have been distracted by his use of a hands-free cell phone, see Strayer, Drews, & Crouch, A Comparison of the Cell Phone Driver and the Drunk Driver, 48 Human Factors 381, 388 (2006), or distracted by an intense sports argument with José, see D. Strayer et al., AAA Foundation for Traffic Safety, Measuring Cognitive Distraction in the Automobile 28 (June 2013), online at https://www.aaafoundation.org/
sites/default/files/MeasuringCognitiveDistractions.pdf as visitedApr. 17, 2014, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file). ——————
2The Court’s discussion of reliable 911 trace ability has so little relevance to the present case that one must surmise it has been included merely to assure officers in the future that anonymous 911 accusations—even untraced ones—are not as suspect (and hence as unreliable) as other anonymous accusations. That is unfortunate.
Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 7
SCALIA, J., dissenting
Or, indeed, he might have intentionally forced the tipster off the road because of some personal animus, or hostility to her “Make Love, Not War” bumper sticker. I fail to see how reasonable suspicion of a discrete instance of irregular or hazardous driving generates a reasonable suspicion of ongoing intoxicated driving. What proportion of the hundreds of thousands—perhaps millions—of careless, reckless, or intentional traffic violations committed each day is attributable to drunken drivers? I say 0.1 percent. I have no basis for that except my own guesswork. But unless the Court has some basis in reality to believe that the proportion is many orders of magnitude above that—say 1 in 10 or at least 1 in 20—it has no grounds for its unsupported assertion that the tipster’s report in this case gave rise to a reasonable suspicion of drunken driving.
Bear in mind that that is the only basis for the stop that has been asserted in this litigation.3 The stop required suspicion of an ongoing crime, not merely suspicion of having run someone off the road earlier. And driving while being a careless or reckless person, unlike driving while being a drunk person, is not an ongoing crime. In other words, in order to stop the petitioners the officers here not only had to assume without basis the accuracy of the anonymous accusation but also had to posit an unlikely reason (drunkenness) for the accused behavior.
In sum, at the moment the police spotted the truck, it was more than merely “possib[le]” that the petitioners were not committing an ongoing traffic crime. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U. S. 266, 277 (2002) (emphasis
—————— 3The circumstances that may justify a stop under Terry v. Ohio, 392
U. S. 1 (1968), to investigate past criminal activity are far from clear, see United States v. Hensley, 469 U. S. 221, 229 (1985), and have not been discussed in this litigation. Hence, the Court says it “need not address” that question. Ante, at 8, n. 2. I need not either. This case has been litigated on the assumption that only suspicion of ongoing intoxicated or reckless driving could have supported this stop.
SCALIA, J., dissenting
added). It was overwhelmingly likely that they were not.
III It gets worse. Not only, it turns out, did the police have no good reason at first to believe that Lorenzo was driving drunk, they had very good reason at last to know that he was not. The Court concludes that the tip, plus confirmation of the truck’s location, produced reasonable suspicion that the truck not only had been but still was barreling dangerously and drunkenly down Highway 1. Ante, at 8–
10. In fact, alas, it was not, and the officers knew it. They followed the truck for five minutes, presumably to see if it was being operated recklessly. And that was good police work. While the anonymous tip was not enough to support a stop for drunken driving under Terry v. Ohio, 392
U. S. 1 (1968), it was surely enough to counsel observation of the truck to see if it was driven by a drunken driver. But the pesky little detail left out of the Court’s reason- able-suspicion equation is that, for the five minutes that the truck was being followed (five minutes is a long time),Lorenzo’s driving was irreproachable. Had the officers witnessed the petitioners violate a single traffic law, they would have had cause to stop the truck, Whren v. United States, 517 U. S. 806, 810 (1996), and this case would not be before us. And not only was the driving irreproachable, but the State offers no evidence to suggest that the petitioners even did anything suspicious, such as suddenly slowing down, pulling off to the side of the road, or turning somewhere to see whether they were being followed. Cf. Arvizu, supra, at 270–271, 277 (concluding that an officer’s suspicion of criminality was enhanced when the driver, upon seeing that he was being followed, “slowed dramatically,” “appeared stiff,” and “seemed to be trying to pretend” that the patrol car was not there). Consequently,the tip’s suggestion of ongoing drunken driving (if it could be deemed to suggest that) not only went uncorroborated;
Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 9
SCALIA, J., dissenting
it was affirmatively undermined.
A hypothetical variation on the facts of this case illustrates the point. Suppose an anonymous tipster reports that, while following near mile marker 88 a silver Ford F-150, license plate 8D949925, traveling southbound on Highway 1, she saw in the truck’s open cab several five foot-tall stacks of what was unmistakably baled cannabis. Two minutes later, a highway patrolman spots the truck exactly where the tip suggested it would be, begins following it, but sees nothing in the truck’s cab. It is not enough to say that the officer’s observation merely failed to corroborate the tipster’s accusation. It is more precise to say that the officer’s observation discredited the informant’s accusation: The crime was supposedly occurring (and would continue to occur) in plain view, but the police saw nothing. Similarly, here, the crime supposedly suggested by the tip was ongoing intoxicated driving, the hallmarks of which are many, readily identifiable, and difficult to conceal. That the officers witnessed nary a minor traffic violation nor any other “sound indici[um] of drunk driving,” ante, at 8, strongly suggests that the suspected crime was not occurring after all. The tip’s implication of continuing criminality, already weak, grew even weaker.
Resisting this line of reasoning, the Court curiously asserts that, since drunk drivers who see marked squad cars in their rearview mirrors may evade detection simply by driving “more careful[ly],” the “absence of additional suspicious conduct” is “hardly surprising” and thus largely irrelevant. Ante, at 10. Whether a drunk driver drives drunkenly, the Court seems to think, is up to him. That is not how I understand the influence of alcohol. I subscribe to the more traditional view that the dangers of intoxi- cated driving are the intoxicant’s impairing effects on the body—effects that no mere act of the will can resist. See, e.g., A. Dasgupta, The Science of Drinking: How Alcohol Affects Your Body and Mind 39 (explaining that the physi10
SCALIA, J., dissenting
ological effect of a blood alcohol content between 0.08 and 0.109, for example, is “sever[e] impair[ment]” of “[b]alance,speech, hearing, and reaction time,” as well as one’s general “ability to drive a motor vehicle”). Consistent with this view, I take it as a fundamental premise of our intoxicated-driving laws that a driver soused enough to swerve once can be expected to swerve again—and soon. If he does not, and if the only evidence of his first episode of irregular driving is a mere inference from an uncorroborated, vague, and nameless tip, then the Fourth Amendment requires that he be left alone.
* * * The Court’s opinion serves up a freedom-destroying cocktail consisting of two parts patent falsity: (1) that anonymous 911 reports of traffic violations are reliable so long as they correctly identify a car and its location, and
(2) that a single instance of careless or reckless driving necessarily supports a reasonable suspicion of drunkenness. All the malevolent 911 caller need do is assert a traffic violation, and the targeted car will be stopped, forcibly if necessary, by the police. If the driver turns out not to be drunk (which will almost always be the case), the caller need fear no consequences, even if 911 knows his identity. After all, he never alleged drunkenness, but merely called in a traffic violation—and on that point his word is as good as his victim’s.
Drunken driving is a serious matter, but so is the loss of our freedom to come and go as we please without police interference. To prevent and detect murder we do not allow searches without probable cause or targeted Terry stops without reasonable suspicion. We should not do so for drunken driving either. After today’s opinion all of us on the road, and not just drug dealers, are at risk of having our freedom of movement curtailed on suspicion of drunkenness, based upon a phone tip, true or false, of a
Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) SCALIA, J., dissenting single instance of careless driving. I respectfully dissent.

Thursday, April 10, 2014


DUI victim struggles to get life back on course, as told to San Diego MADD, lawyers report

Her fear of being judged by a room full of police officers at a San Diego County Mothers Against Drink Driving MADD awards luncheon was short lived.

It was trumped by courage and the wall-to-wall love and support for the young woman in her 20s as she walked up to the lectern. Her handless left arm was dangling along her side.
She had been the victim of a drunken driver. She is now determined to get her message out: drinking and driving doesn’t just kill — it also maims its victims, as it did her. 
Jessica Creed has been waging an uphill battle to survive since the May 2013 DUI crash. Most of the near 300 officers in the auditorium had followed her recovery in and out of the hospital. Many were responsible for hundreds of DUI arrests throughout the current year. For much of 2013, Jessica was in shock and disbelief over her lot in life that derailed her career plans. 
I had flown down to the Southland to see our youngest son being honored with a litany of credits for his continuing support for MADD. Tim had a page in the luncheon program that cited his accomplishments.
It was a proud day for this dad to see a son recognized for his continuing efforts to serve and protect in a job with many challenges and often too little sleep. He has truly gone above and beyond in supporting MADD on his own time over the 14 years he has served as an officer. Tim stands behind their drive to reduce the slaughter on the roadways due to drinking and driving.
I will never forget how very distraught he was early in his career when he was dispatched to a crash where an elderly woman was trapped in her vehicle and mortally injured. Using his baton he tried to bend the door frame open, but to no avail, in attempting to rescue her. Creed drew a lengthy standing ovation from her audience after telling of the long physical and psychological, and emotional journey toward recovery. That included learning how to talk and walk all over again having spent more than three months in the hospital. 
She had a broken jaw, broken hand, broken sternum, broken pelvis in two places, lacerated liver, broken vertebra and a smashed face that allowed her only to make use of sign language to communicate with her family and medical personnel. 
The 30-year-old suspect in the DUI crash was arrested and released from custody. Since then he has failed to answer to charges twice along and has been charged for being drunk in public. He is currently considered a fugitive from justice. 
Creed has developed a site on Facebook attempting to create more of an awareness of the traumatic results of drinking and driving and how it derailed the future of an energetic young woman who had intended to become a nurse. Although a little difficult to contain her composure at times, she is continuing to speak to other groups about her traumatic near death experience hoping some will listen and avoid the hell she has gone through. Her Facebook site is Jmcreed21@yahoo.com – “a cause for awareness.” 
“I couldn’t walk, talk, bathe myself, use the bathroom without assistance or use either of my hands going through some 15 surgeries because of this man’s (DUI) crime. It’s not easy to be a victim but it is even harder to be a survivor having to be strong, move forward and not let the pain, hurt and sorrow control your life,” she said. “The many hours I have spent reflecting (on my future) one thing is clear: whatever I do, I will be successful.” 
She thanked the officers who had been intently listening to her story. It was so quiet you could hear the proverbial pin drop. 
“Being a police officer is a pretty thankless job from my understanding,” Creed said. “But, for me I could not give enough thanks for all that you do. Each drunk driver that you arrest on our roads helps prevent another person from having to experience what I have experienced. It’s men and women like yourselves that offer survivors like me closure and offer the would-be survivors renewed happiness in their own lives.” 
She closed with: “From the bottom of my heart, thank you!” 
A foundation has been created to assist Jessica and her family with medical bills.  Go to Facebook under Jessica Creed Foundation for more information.

Tuesday, April 08, 2014


Dr. Joe Citron pleads no contest to perjury after inflating his DUI expert credentials, say Georgia drunk driving attorneys

San Diego DUI lawyers are familiar with Dr. Joe Citron.  Apparently he may have exaggerated some of his DUI expert credentials, San Diego attorneys are told:

A Georgia eye doctor pleads no contest in Lancaster County Court to nine counts of perjury.  Dr. Joseph Citron, of Atlanta, lied about his credentials as a drunk driving expert in DUI trials in Dauphin, Lancaster, Lebanon, Centre and Clinton counties between March 10, 2010 and March 16, 2012.
During questioning concerning his qualifications, Dr. Citron, who is an ophthalmologist, testified that he was an instructor at the Georgia Public Safety Training Center, training police officers in the area of first responder and SFST for approximately 10 years.  He also testified that in 2000 Georgia Governor’s Officer of Highway Safety appointed him to a program called “Drunk Busters.”  He also testified that as part of the “Drunk Buster” program he went around the state reviewing SFSTs with various police departments.
The Lancaster County District Attorney’s Office began an investigation in Dr. Citron’s alleged credentials.  County detectives requested the assistance of the Georgia Bureau of Investigation in determining what if any affiliation Dr. Citron had with GPSTC and the alleged “Drunk Buster” program.  It was determined that Dr. Citron was never part of the faculty at GPSTC in the area of SFST. Rather Dr. Citron was a guest lecturer at the GPSTC Fire Academy with respect to eye injuries as part of a first responder course.  He was also never used to teach SFST to police officers at GPSTC.
During a recorded interview, Dr. Citron admitted that he inflated his credentials in the area of SFST because it “sounds good.”  He further admitted that the Governor never contacted him to be part of a “Drunk Busters” Program, but did provide a contact to verify the program’s existence. That individual informed investigators that the two speeches he did invite Dr. Citron to assist in were never referred to as “Drunk Busters,” and it was never presented as part of a Governor’s Office program.
At the conclusion of the joint investigation it was determined that Dr. Citron testified falsely to his involvement with GPSTC and the “Drunk Busters” Program in order to qualify as an expert in SFST and bolster his credibility on that topic. Both portions of testimony were material to his qualifications to render an opinion regarding SFST, as well as his potential defense bias. As a result, officials in Dauphin, Centre, Clinton, Franklin, Lancaster, and Lebanon Counties all charged Dr. Citron with Perjury and related offenses.
In Lancaster County Court this morning, Dr. Citron plead no contest to nine counts of Perjury, nine counts of False Swearing, and one cojnt of Unsworn Falsification.  Dr. Citron was sentenced to the Intermediate Punishment Program for a period of 7 years, with the first 60 days to be served on house arrest with electronic monitoring. He was also ordered to pay fines totaling $1,000.00 and the costs of prosecution.

Read more: http://fox43.com/2014/04/08/fake-georgia-dui-expert-pleads-no-contest-to-perjury-charges/#ixzz2yKgiOwaP

Saturday, April 05, 2014


Video of man stopped at DUI checkpoint who refuses to answers questions and is allowed to leave

Check this out.  Guy gets stopped at Boulder Colorado PD DUI checkpoint.

Refuses to answer any questions.  (Must have got some good advice from a San Diego California DUI attorney.)

Gets one cop after another to identify himself or herself with personnel number.

Each cop answers.

They keep asking him if had anything to drink.  He refuses to answer.

He asks if he is free to go.

Finally he's told he can go and to have a nice night, sir.

Here's a list of San Diego California DUI checkpoints posted by attorney Rick Mueller.

Sunday, March 30, 2014


Del Mar Drunk Driving Hit & Run leads to San Diego DUI arrest and manslaughter charges, lawyers are told

Bad, sad news out of Del Mar San Diego California this weekend, say San Diego DUI lawyers.  One death, one drunk driving arrest, say San Diego DUI attorney Rick Mueller.  Here's the report:

A forty-one year old man allegedly did not stop at a stop sign and hit a lady crossing the street. He has been arrested on suspicion of vehicular manslaughter in the death of a 27-year-old woman who was killed in a hit-and-run crash in Del Mar, say San Diego DUI attorneys.

Rachel Anne Morrison and a friend were walking eastbound in a crosswalk at the intersection of Camino Del Mar and Coast Boulevard about 10:15 p.m. Friday when Christopher Stockmeyer, 41, allegedly ran a stop sign and struck her at a high rate of speed, according to sheriff's officials and the county Medical Examiner's Office.  Fortunately, the other pedestrian was able to get out of the way.

Morrison, of Encinitas, was taken to Scripps Memorial Hospital La Jolla where she was declared dead shortly after arrival, according to the Medical Examiner's Office.

The driver alegedly fled the scene, authorities said. Sheriff's deputies and San Diego police used evidence left behind after the crash to locate the vehicle and Stockmeyer, its registered owner, at an apartment complex in La Jolla.

Stockmeyer was subsequently arrested and booked into the Vista Detention Facility on suspicion of felony drunken driving, felony hit and run and vehicular manslaughter, according to sheriff's officials and jail records.

Friday, March 28, 2014


California Highway Patrol looking for San Diego DUI suspect who caused woman to lose arm, say lawyers

News Release - San Diego DUI suspect hunted, attorneys say.

San Diego, California.

CHP is asking for your help to find a local musician who seriously injured a woman in a San Diego DUI crash, then failed to show up in court.

The CHP says Daniel Castro was arrested on DUI charges after the accident last May. He posted bond, but officials say he failed to show up for a recent court appearance. Now there's a $600,000 warrant for his arrest.

According to the CHP, Castro was driving the wrong way on the I-5 freeway near First Avenue when he drove head on into a 28-year-old woman. Officials say the woman was so seriously injured she lost her arm.

Castro played keyboard in the local band Long Live Logos.

He is described as five foot four inches tall, 150 pounds, with brown medium length hair. Anyone with information is urged to call the CHP.

Tuesday, March 25, 2014


San Diego DUI cops are all over St. Patrick's Day party-goers, California lawyers report.

San Diego DUI California lawyers report an uptick in DUI and Zero Tolerance (.01%) arrests/detention.  San Diego County DUI Law Center defends these types of actions so contact your California DUI attorney today for help.

 San Diego County Sheriff's Department, Escondido Police Department, La Mesa Police Department, and UCSD Police Department conducted San Diego & California DUI Saturation Patrols during the evening of St. Patrick's Day in the following cities:  San Diego, San Marcos, Solana Beach, Del Mar, Encinitas, Escondido, Imperial Beach, La Mesa, Poway, and Vista.

Of the 14 San Diego DUI California Deputies and Officers working one night, they made 121 traffic stops. They evaluated 35 drivers for driving under the influence of Alcohol and/or Drugs. There were four people arrested for San Diego DUI where Alcohol was involved and two people were arrested for DUI where Alcohol and Drugs were involved.

There were seven drivers cited for driving without a driver's license. The focus of the San Diego DUI operation was the apprehension of suspects who were determined to be operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated and/or under the influence of drugs.

These San Diego DUI saturation patrols were funded by a grant through the California Office of Traffic Safety.

"Report Drunk Drivers. Call 911" is what police keep saying.

Tuesday, February 25, 2014


5 to 20 years in state prison for DUI death near the Strip, San Diego DUI attorneys report

A San Diego man, Edris Ghani, was ordered to serve 5 to 20 years in state prison for DUI death and causing a fatal crash near the Las Vegas Strip that killed a woman celebrating her 21st birthday with her mother, San Diego DUI lawyers report.
Mother Cynthia Konarski related the story during sentencing Monday for 35-year-old drunk driving defendant in Clark County District Court.  She explained how the 4 a.m. crash in December 2010 killed her daughter, Christina Konarski, and left her with a paralyzed arm.
DUI Police report the mom and daughter were stopped at a traffic signal on Tropicana Avenue when a speeding Mercedes-Benz CLS550 rear ended their Mercury Sable.
Ghani and his passenger escaped serious injury.  Ghani pleaded guilty in October to DUI causing death or substantial bodily harm.  No comments were published by his drunk driving criminal defense attorney.

Monday, February 24, 2014


Passed field tests and still arrested for DUI is ok in one state other than California, attorneys note

Field sobriety tests are voluntary in California DUI cases, say San Diego lawyers.
Yet most San Diego DUI police get suspected drunk drivers to do FST's, remind San Diego DUI attorneys. What is the real value of FST's?
What if someone did well on them, should he or she still be arrested for DUI?

Well, the Tennessee Supreme Court addressed this latter issue when it
decided on Thursday that the only use for roadside sobriety tests is to
collect evidence against motorists, using them to convict individuals for
driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). The high court justices
overturned an appellate decision from 2012 that found a driver who passed
six of the tests with flying colors should never have been arrested. David D. Bell
was arrested on May 13, 2009, even though the trial judge found no evidence
of impairment in the sobriety tests when he reviewed the dashcam footage.

"I honestly think that he did pretty dog-gone good on the field sobriety
tests, better than most I've seen," Sevier County Circuit Court Judge Rex
Henry Ogle observed. "I couldn't pass them as well as he did."

On that early morning in 2009, Bell had stopped by the The Roaming Gnome Pub
and Eatery located in Sevierville and had a few drinks. He made a mistake
and ended up on the wrong side of the road when Sevierville Police Officer
Timothy Russell came upon him. On the roadside, Bell performed the
four-finger count, recited the alphabet from G to S, and identified for
Officer Russell in what year he turned six. Officer Russell rated his mental
acuity as "excellent. " Bell also passed the one-leg stand and the
walk-and-turn test. 

Despite the performance, Officer Russell decided to arrest Bell. Bell moved
to suppress the evidence against him, arguing that there was no probable
cause for his warrantless arrest. Seeking a conviction, the Supreme Court
justices looked to several other states for sympathetic rulings.

"We recognize that not all courts that have addressed this question have
reached the same conclusion as the Delaware Supreme Court, the Alaska Court
of Appeals, the Minnesota Court of Appeals and the Pennsylvania Commonwealth
Court," Justice William C. Koch Jr wrote. "However, we have determined that
the approach employed by these courts is entirely consistent with our
holdings that determining the existence of probable cause to support a
warrantless arrest is not a technical process. Rather, it is a process
requiring reviewing courts to conduct a common-sense analysis of the facts
and circumstances known to the officers at the time of arrest... we find
that performance on field sobriety tests is but one of the many factors
officers should consider when deciding whether to arrest a motorist for DUI
or similar offenses without a warrant."

The justices reasoned that under the totality of circumstances, passing the
sobriety tests is insufficient to cancel out the effect of other indications
of intoxication, including the smell of alcohol and a traffic violation. For
this reason, the court reversed the lower court findings and agreed with
prosecutors that Officer Russell had probable cause to arrest Bell for DUI
and ordered the charges to be reinstated against him. The justices noted
that Bell may use his performance on the sobriety tests to raise reasonable
doubt of his guilt at trial.

Tuesday, February 18, 2014


Pacific Beach area in San Diego "DUI - dangerous" warn California drunk driving attorneys

Stay away from DUI checkpoints in Pacific Beach San Diego California, DUI lawyers posting relevant Google map locations say.  It is dangerous for many reasons, warn San Diego dui attorneys.

One San Diego DUI driver and another motorist were hospitalized following a two-car drunk driving crash on Interstate 5 near Mission Bay yesterday when a small, Mini-Cooper and a Ford Fusion crashed in the northbound lanes north of Clairemont Drive shortly after 8:30 a.m., according to the California dui lawyers.

The Mini Cooper overturned in the center divider, and the other vehicle temporarily blocked one lane and at least one of the two people taken to Scripps Mercy Hospital after the crash sustained major injuries, according to San Diego dui attorneys.

Sunday, January 26, 2014


Social host busted after 911 call leads to underage drinkers, say San Diego DUI lawyers

A number of San Diego DUI arrests begin with a 911 call, attorneys remind.  The police have an obligation to go to a house where a 911 call originated from, if they think a criminal act may be going on or someone is in need of assistance, say San Diego California DUI lawyers.

Yesterday, here's how someone got busted in North San Diego County.

On January 25th, at about 2245 hours, the Sheriff's communication center received a 911 call from an un-identified female who provided an address of 1420 Borden Road, in San Marcos and was heard crying before the line disconnected. The female did not provide additional details regarding why she called 911. Deputies responded to the location in order to check the welfare of the female.

Upon arrival, deputies determined a large party was taking place at the residence. A male who was later identified as 23 year old Jason Gonzales opened the door and identified himself as the host of the party. Gonzales was involved in a physical altercation with deputies and was ultimately placed under arrest for a social host violation and resisting an officer with force.

Several underage party goers were also arrested for social host violations after they were determined to be intoxicated.

Thursday, December 05, 2013


Dog barely survives San Diego DUI accident, attorneys share

Dog lovers will hate this story.  It's about a San Diego DUI driver who hit a nice dog, lawyers are told.   Lots of medical work later, the dog survived is the good ending, San Diego DUI attorneys suppose.  You can help with the medical bills by using the email below.

 The five-year-old American bulldog struck by a car driven by a suspected San Diego drunk driver in Vista will undergo a leg amputation, the dog’s owner and roommate mentioned last night.
The car plowed into a doghouse where the bulldog, “Lucky,” was sleeping. He suffered a badly fractured hip and back right leg.

An x-ray shows Lucky's badly fractured bones. 

The crash occurred about 10:20 p.m. at the home on Foothill Drive near Huntalas Lane, said resident Jason Salazar, 34, who is the dog owner’s roommate. Salazar said he, owner Jason Ehrengruber and another roommate were home. “We heard a huge screeching and a huge boom like an explosion happened,” he said.
They ran outside and saw the car, a Ford Focus, had slammed through a wooden fence and into the dog shelter. “The doghouse was blown up,” Salazar said.
The woman driving and a man in the front seat were just starting to stumble out of the car, he said.
Salazar said everyone’s first concern was Lucky and another dog, a boxer named Ryder, because they were nowhere to be found.
“We thought the dogs were dead,” he said.
Ryder showed up a short time later at the front door with a ripped-off toenail. Lucky was found a few minutes later further back on the 2-acre property shivering and standing on three legs. The roommates scooped him up with a sheet and took him to an emergency veterinarian.
The driver was identified by authorities as Nadine Cardoza, 41, of Vista. Officers at the scene said she was “extremely intoxicated,” said CHP Officer Jim Bettencourt. She was arrested and booked into jail on a drunken driving charge.
Salazar said the woman tried to run, and her passenger offered the men money to give him a ride home.
On Wednesday night, Lucky was at California Veterinary Specialists in Carlsbad, where he would undergo surgery, Ehrengruber and Salazar said in an email.
They researched the possibility of having Lucky fitted with a prosthetic leg, but determined it would not be a good idea because of the risk of infection and other concerns.
The roommates have set up an account to help defray surgery costs. Salazar said the operation could cost from $8,000 to $12,000. So far, they have raised about $5,600, he said.
“The generosity of the people of San Diego is overwhelming,” Salazar said.
Anyone wishing to donate funds for Lucky’s recovery can get information by sending an email to saveLuckysLife@gmail.com.

Saturday, November 30, 2013


San Diego DUI defendant with breath test of .08% may argue that the particular breathalyzer malfunctioned or was improperly calibrated or used, but cannot challenge the overall reliability of such tests, San Diego DUI attorneys retweet Union Tribune story

The San Diego Union - Tribune reports this San Diego California DUI attorney story:

"Kudos to San Diego City Attorney Jan Goldsmith for aggressively pursuing a drunk-driving case all the way to the California Supreme Court — and saving the breath test in the process.
The high court heard the case on appeal by Terry Vangelder, arrested on suspicion of driving under the influence in 2007 after a Highway Patrol sergeant clocked him at 125 mph on state Route 163.
Breath tests put Vangelder just above the legal blood alcohol limit, leading to a guilty verdict at trial. But because the judge refused to allow defense experts to testify that breath alcohol readings may inherently be inaccurate, an appellate court in 2011 reversed the decision.
Goldsmith appealed and, in a unanimous decision written by Chief Justice Tani Cantil-Sakauye, the high court held that a defendant whose breath test exceeds the 0.08 blood alcohol limit may argue that the particular breathalyzer malfunctioned or was improperly calibrated or used, but cannot challenge the overall reliability of such tests.
Letting the appeals court ruling stand would have undermined one of the key mechanisms of California’s battle against drunken driving. And Goldsmith, whose office last year prosecuted 5,550 DUI cases with a 99.3 percent conviction rate, is to be commended for recognizing the importance of the precedent involved in this case.

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