San Diego DUI criminal defense lawyers and San Diego drunk driving criminal defense attorneys hear that San Bernardino Police Department Targets Impaired Drivers with Checkpoint for DUI and San Jose Police Department Targets Impaired Drivers with Checkpoint for drunk drivers.

Traffic Sgt R. Lawhead explains that the San Bernardino Police Department will be conducting a California DUI / Drunk Driving /Drivers License checkpoint on Friday, February 27, 2009, from 6:00 PM to 2:00 AM in the 1500 block of South E Street.

This California DUI / Drunk Driving program is part if the Police Department’s overall effort to reduce the number of persons killed and injured in alcohol involved crashes, DUI checkpoints are conducted to identify offenders and get them off the street, as well as educate the public on the dangers of California DUI / Drunk Driving impaired driving.

All too often, members of our community are senselessly injured or killed on local roadways by impaired drivers. This California DUI / Drunk Driving /Drivers License checkpoint is conducted in an effort to reduce those tragedies, as well as insuring drivers have a valid driver’s license. A major component of these checkpoints is to increase awareness of the dangers of California DUI / Drunk Driving - impaired driving and to encourage sober designated drivers.

A California DUI / Drunk Driving checkpoint is a proven effective method for achieving this goal. By publicizing these enforcement and education efforts, the San Bernardino Police Department believes motorists can be deterred from drinking and driving.

Traffic volume and weather permitting, all vehicles may be checked and drivers who are under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs will be arrested. Our objective is to send a clear message to those who are considering driving a motor vehicle after consuming alcohol and/or drugs – Drunk Driving, Over the Limit, Under Arrest. The public is encouraged to help keep roadways safe by calling 911 if they see a suspected California DUI / Drunk Driving - impaired driver.

Funding for this California DUI / Drunk Driving operation is provided by a grant from the California Office of Traffic Safety, through the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.

San Jose Police Department Targets Impaired Drivers with California DUI / Drunk Driving Checkpoint

The San Jose Police Department will be also conducting a DUI/Drivers License checkpoint on Friday, February 27, 2009, from 9:00 PM to 3:00 AM, at an undisclosed location in San Jose. In an effort to reduce the number of persons killed and injured in alcohol involved crashes, DUI checkpoints are conducted to identify offenders and get them off the street, as well as educate the public on the dangers of impaired driving.

All too often, members of our community are senselessly injured or killed on local roadways by impaired drivers. This DUI/Drivers License checkpoint is an effort to reduce those tragedies, as well as insuring drivers have a valid driver’s license. A major component of these checkpoints is to increase awareness of the dangers of impaired driving and to encourage sober designated drivers.

A DUI checkpoint is a proven effective method for achieving this goal. By publicizing these enforcement and education efforts, the San Jose Police Department believes motorists can be deterred from drinking and driving.

Traffic volume and weather permitting, all vehicles may be checked and drivers who are under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs will be arrested. Our objective is to send a clear message to those who are considering driving a motor vehicle after consuming alcohol and/or drugs - Drunk Driving, Over the Limit, Under Arrest. The public is encouraged to help keep roadways safe by calling 911 if they see a suspected California DUI / Drunk Driver or impaired driver.

Funding for this California DUI / Drunk Driving operation is provided by a grant from the California Office of Traffic Safety, through the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.

San Diego DUI Lawyer Rick Mueller, a San Diego Drunk Driving / DWI Defense Attorney handling San Diego California DUI & DMV cases, shows how a San Diego DUI Lawyer will help you. FREE SAN DIEGO DUI & DMV DEFENSE "EVALUATION FORM" San Diego DUI Defense Resource Center:

San Diego DUI criminal defense lawyers and San Diego DUI criminal defense attorneys are told that two women escaped serious injury Thursday morning when their SUV slammed into a guardrail in Kearny Mesa, San Diego California.

The guardrail sliced into the SUV, but the seatbelted women suffered only minor injuries.

It happened on Kearny Mesa Boulevard over the 163.

Police arrested the driver on suspicion of San Diego DUI or drunk driving / driving under the influence.

The guardrail had to be cut from the wreckage before the SUV could be towed away. The driver may have to pay for the guardrail.

A premier San Diego DUI attorney will be one with over 25 years of experience and expertise in San Diego California drunk driving cases. Excellent San Diego court outcomes and satisfied clients will also be illustrative of the talent of your San Diego DUI / drunk driving criminal attorney.



San Diego DUI law firms provide free initial consultation to learn more about your case. To find the best San Diego DUI criminal defense lawyer, visit
San Diego California Criminal Defense Attorney Rick Mueller recently spoke at the California Attorneys For Criminal Justice annual DUI seminar in Rancho Mirage, California: http://www.cacj.org/Events/forms/DUI%20Brochure%20Final.pdf . The California criminal defense lawyers who attended informed the President of the California DUI Lawyers Association that San Diego California DUI criminal defense attorney Rick Mueller was excellent.

List of Quality San Diego DUI Attorneys

San Diego DUI criminal defense lawyers are told Tom Ammiano introduced a proposal on Monday to legalize marijuana and tax it. He wants the legal age to partake in marijuana to be the same as alcohol, 21 years. The proposal asks for a tax of $50 for the sale of every ounce of pot. He wants to see our retail stores with pot on the shelves.

There are so many complications with this issue. I have heard of marijuana being laced with other substances, so who would regulate the growth, processing, and packaging of marijuana? The FDA can’t do it, they are a federal agency and marijuana is still illegal under federal law. Will there be name brands on our convenience store shelves? Fields of marijuana crops?

California DUI or driving under the influence will still be illegal, but our county doesn’t even have drunk driving under control, so why are we inviting more problems in? Another comment mentioned taking the revenue away from gangs and putting it into legitimate business, just who do you think is going to be selling the stuff legally? Retailers will have to buy it from somebody if they want to stock it and right now the only people who are growing it are doing it illegally or for medical purposes.

Some who say even medical marijuana should not be legal, that opinion changed thanks to this community so now it's time to ask: What are the risks and benefits in this situation? When people are in pain and need relief from suffering that easily outweighs the risks associated with legalizing medical marijuana. When college students and parents just want to kick back and relax, is it really worth it?San Diego DUI Lawyer Rick Mueller, a San Diego Drunk Driving / DWI Defense Attorney handling San Diego California DUI & DMV cases, shows how a Top-Rated San Diego DUI Lawyer will help you. San Diego DUI Lawyer - San Diego Attorney Drunk Driving can help you beat the San Diego drunk driving charge:

San Diego DUI Lawyer Rick Mueller, a San Diego Drunk Driving / DWI Defense Attorney handling San Diego California DUI & DMV cases, shows how a San Diego DUI Lawyer will help you.
FREE SAN DIEGO DUI & DMV DEFENSE "EVALUATION FORM"
San Diego DUI Defense Resource Center:
San Diego DUI Lawyer Rick Mueller, a San Diego Drunk Driving / DWI Defense Attorney handling San Diego California DUI & DMV cases, shows how a San Diego DUI Lawyer will help you.

San Diego DUI criminal defense lawyers have some information for someone arrested for a California DUI.

In California, it is illegal to drive if you are impaired by alcohol or drugs, or a combination of alcohol and drugs. It is also illegal to drive with a BAC of .08 or higher ("per se" DUI). Under California's per se DUI law, proof of impairment is not necessary - the fact that you have a BAC of .08 or higher within three hours of driving is enough evidence in and of itself. Any person who is pulled over for DUI in California may be charged under BOTH the impairment section AND the per se section of the statute, but only one punishment may be imposed. The punishments for violating the per se section and the impairment section are the same. Both offenses are misdomeanors. See California DUI penalties for more information.

Felony DUI: Under California's felony DUI law, it is unlawful to drive a vehicle while impaired or with a BAC of .08 or higher and commit an act or fail to act in such a way that results in bodily injury to another person. There must be bodily injury to another, not the driver, in order to be charged under this statute.

Vehicular Manslaughter: Any DUI that proximately results in death may be charged under California's vehicular manslaughter statute.

Under 21 Years Old: Persons under the age of 21 who are pulled over for DUI in California with a BAC of .01 or higher will be charged with DUI.


23152 - Driving Under Influence of Alcohol or Drugs.

(a) It is unlawful for any person who is under the influence of any alcoholic beverage or drug, or under the combined influence of any alcoholic beverage and drug, to drive a vehicle.

(b) It is unlawful for any person who has 0.08 percent or more, by weight, of alcohol in his or her blood to drive a vehicle.

For purposes of this article and Section 34501.16, percent, by weight, of alcohol in a person's blood is based upon grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood or grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath.

In any prosecution under this subdivision, it is a rebuttable presumption that the person had 0.08 percent or more, by weight, of alcohol in his or her blood at the time of driving the vehicle if the person had 0.08 percent or more, by weight, of alcohol in his or her blood at the time of the performance of a chemical test within three hours after the driving.

(c) It is unlawful for any person who is addicted to the use of any drug to drive a vehicle. This subdivision shall not apply to a person who is participating in a narcotic treatment program approved pursuant to Article 3 (commencing with Section 11875) of Chapter 1 of Part 3 of Division 10.5 of the Health and Safety Code.

(d) It is unlawful for any person who has 0.04 percent or more, by weight, of alcohol in his or her blood to drive a commercial motor vehicle, as defined in Section 15210.

In any prosecution under this subdivision, it is a rebuttable presumption that the person had 0.04 percent or more, by weight, of alcohol in his or her blood at the time of driving the vehicle if the person had 0.04 percent or more, by weight, of alcohol in his or her blood at the time of the performance of a chemical test within three hours after the driving.

(e) This section shall become operative on January 1, 1992, and shall remain operative until the director determines that federal regulations adopted pursuant to the Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1986 (49 U.S.C. Sec. 2701 et seq.) contained in Section 383.51 or 391.15 of Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations do not require the state to prohibit operation of commercial vehicles when the operator has a concentration of alcohol in his or her blood of 0.04 percent by weight or more.

(f) The director shall submit a notice of the determination under subdivision (e) to the Secretary of State, and this section shall be repealed upon the receipt of that notice by the Secretary of State.

**This section remains in effect only until notice by the Secretary of State, at which time it is repealed and the following section becomes effective:

(a) It is unlawful for any person who is under the influence of any alcoholic beverage or drug, or under the combined influence of any alcoholic beverage and drug, to drive a vehicle..

(b) It is unlawful for any person who has 0.08 percent or more, by weight, of alcohol in his or her blood to drive a vehicle.

For purposes of this article and Section 34501.16, percent, by weight, of alcohol in a person's blood is based upon grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood or grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath.

In any prosecution under this subdivision, it is a rebuttable presumption that the person had 0.08 percent or more, by weight, of alcohol in his or her blood at the time of driving the vehicle if the person had 0.08 percent or more, by weight, of alcohol in his or her blood at the time of the performance of a chemical test within three hours after the driving.

(c) It is unlawful for any person who is addicted to the use of any drug to drive a vehicle. This subdivision shall not apply to a person who is participating in a narcotic treatment program approved pursuant to Article 3 (commencing with Section 11875) of Chapter 1 of Part 3 of Division 10.5 of the Health and Safety Code.

(d) This section shall become operative only upon the receipt by the Secretary of State of the notice specified in subdivision (f) of Section 23152, as added by Section 25 of Chapter 1114 of the Statutes of 1989.



23153 - Driving Under Influence of Alcohol or Drugs Causing Injury (FELONY DUI)

(a) It is unlawful for any person, while under the influence of any alcoholic beverage or drug, or under the combined influence of any alcoholic beverage and drug, to drive a vehicle and concurrently do any act forbidden by law, or neglect any duty imposed by law in driving the vehicle, which act or neglect proximately causes bodily injury to any person other than the driver.

(b) It is unlawful for any person, while having 0.08 percent or more, by weight, of alcohol in his or her blood to drive a vehicle and concurrently do any act forbidden by law, or neglect any duty imposed by law in driving the vehicle, which act or neglect proximately causes bodily injury to any person other than the driver.

In any prosecution under this subdivision, it is a rebuttable presumption that the person had 0.08 percent or more, by weight, of alcohol in his or her blood at the time of driving the vehicle if the person had 0.08 percent or more, by weight, of alcohol in his or her blood at the time of the performance of a chemical test within three hours after driving.

(c) In proving the person neglected any duty imposed by law in driving the vehicle, it is not necessary to prove that any specific section of this code was violated.

(d) It is unlawful for any person, while having 0.04 percent or more, by weight, of alcohol in his or her blood to drive a commercial motor vehicle, as defined in Section 15210, and concurrently do any act forbidden by law or neglect any duty imposed by law in driving the vehicle, which act or neglect proximately causes bodily injury to any person other than the driver.

In any prosecution under this subdivision, it is a rebuttable presumption that the person had 0.04 percent or more, by weight, of alcohol in his or her blood at the time of driving the vehicle if the person had 0.04 percent or more, by weight, of alcohol in his or her blood at the time of performance of a chemical test within three hours after driving.

(e) This section shall become operative on January 1, 1992, and shall remain operative until the director determines that federal regulations adopted pursuant to the Commercial Motor Vehicle Act of 1986 (49 U.S.C. Sec. 2701 et seq.) contained in Section 383.51 or 391.15 of Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations do not require the state to prohibit operation of commercial vehicles when the operator has a concentration of alcohol in his or her blood of 0.04 percent by weight or more.

(f) The director shall submit a notice of the determination under subdivision (e) to the Secretary of State, and this section shall be repealed upon the receipt of that notice by the Secretary of State.

**This section remains in effect only until notice by the Secretary of State, at which time it is repealed and the following section becomes effective:

(a) It is unlawful for any person, while under the influence of any alcoholic beverage or drug, or under the combined influence of any alcoholic beverage and drug, to drive a vehicle and concurrently do any act forbidden by law or neglect any duty imposed by law in driving the vehicle, which act or neglect proximately causes bodily injury to any person other than the driver..

(b) It is unlawful for any person, while having 0.08 percent or more, by weight, of alcohol in his or her blood to drive a vehicle and concurrently do any act forbidden by law or neglect any duty imposed by law in driving the vehicle, which act or neglect proximately causes bodily injury to any person other than the driver.

In any prosecution under this subdivision, it is a rebuttable presumption that the person had 0.08 percent or more, by weight, of alcohol in his or her blood at the time of driving the vehicle if the person had 0.08 percent or more, by weight, of alcohol in his or her blood at the time of the performance of a chemical test within three hours after driving.

(c) In proving the person neglected any duty imposed by law in driving the vehicle, it is not necessary to prove that any specific section of this code was violated.

(d) This section shall become operative only upon the receipt by the Secretary of State of the notice specified in subdivision (f) of Section 23153, as added by Section 30 of Chapter 1114 of the Statutes of 1989.


191.5 - Penal Code - Manslaughter

(a) Gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice aforethought, in the driving of a vehicle, where the driving was in violation of Section 23140, 23152, or 23153 of the Vehicle Code, and the killing was either the proximate result of the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to a felony, and with gross negligence, or the proximate result of the commission of a lawful act that might produce death, in an unlawful manner, and with gross negligence.

(b) Vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice aforethought, in the driving of a vehicle, where the driving was in violation of Section 23140, 23152, or 23153 of the Vehicle Code, and the killing was either the proximate result of the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to a felony, but without gross negligence, or the proximate result of the commission of a lawful act that might produce death, in an unlawful manner, but without gross negligence.

(c) (1) Except as provided in subdivision (d), gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated in violation of subdivision (a) is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for 4, 6, or 10 years.

(2) Vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated in violation of subdivision (b) is punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year or by imprisonment in the state prison for 16 months or 2 or 4 years.

(d) a person convicted of violating subdivision (a) who has one or more prior convictions of this section or of paragraph (1) of subdivision (c) of Section 192, subdivision (a) or (b) of Section 192.5 of this code, or of violating Section 23152 punishable under Sections 23540, 23542, 23546, 23548, 23550, or 23552 of, or convicted of Section 23153 of, the Vehicle Code, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for a term of 15 years to life. Article 2.5 (commencing with Section 2930) of Chapter 7 of Title 1 of Part 3 shall apply to reduce the term imposed pursuant to this subdivision.

(e) This section shall not be construed as prohibiting or precluding a charge of murder under Section 188 upon facts exhibiting wantonness and a conscious disregard for life to support a finding of implied malice, or upon facts showing malice consistent with the holding of the California Supreme Court in People v. Watson, 30 Cal. 3d 290.

(f) This section shall not be construed as making any homicide in the driving of a vehicle or the operation of a vessel punishable which is not a proximate result of the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to felony, or of the commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful manner.

(g) For the penalties in subdivision (d) to apply, the existence of any fact required under subdivision (d) shall be alleged in the information or indictment and either admitted by the defendant in open court or found to be true by the trier of fact.


Click on below sites for more information by a San Diego DUI Lawyer in California

San Diego DUI criminal defense lawyers at and San Diego drunk driving criminal defense attorneys are told on Saturday, February 21, 2009, the Long Beach Police Department conducted a California DUI - Driving Under the Influence / Drivers License Checkpoint at Anaheim Street and Daisy Avenue. Our objective is to send a clear message to those who are considering driving a motor vehicle after consuming alcohol and/or drugs – “Drunk Driving, Over the Limit, Under Arrest.” The Long Beach Police Explorers and Long Beach Search and Rescue assisted the Police Officers at the California DUI checkpoint.

The California DUI checkpoint operated 6:00 p.m. until 2:00 a.m. During the eight-hour operation, 1,200 vehicles passed through the California DUI checkpoint with 323 being screened. Of the vehicles screened, 4 people were arrested for California DUI - driving under the influence and 29 drivers were issued traffic citations.

California DUI Checkpoints are a vital component in the fight against both impaired and unlicensed drivers. Nationally, impaired driving caused by drugs and or alcohol causes one death every 33 minutes. California DUI sobriety checkpoints have been proven to reduce impaired driving related collisions by removing these drivers from our streets. The average American has a 30% chance of being killed or injured by an impaired driver.

This California DUI operation was funded through a grant from the California Office of Traffic Safety, through the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.


San Diego DUI Lawyer Rick Mueller is a premier San Diego County Drunk Driving, DUI & DMV Defense attorney with over 25 years of experience. Known as a "DMV Guru," Rick Mueller dedicates 100% of his law practice to aggressively defending those accused of driving under the influence of alcohol. He has successfully saved the driving privileges of many clients in the past year alone. Complete the important Free San Diego County Drunk Driving Defense Survey to find out your best strategy and to protect your driving privileges in California.

San Diego California Drunk Driving and DUI criminal defense lawyers at report that NBA Hall of Famer Charles Barkley pleaded guilty to drunk driving charges in Scottsdale, Ariz., on Monday and will serve time in jail, California DUI defense attorneys are told.

The TNT basketball analyst and former All-Star faced two misdemeanor charges of DUI from a New Year's Eve arrest in Scottsdale. He also pleaded responsible to a third charge of running a red light, according to San Diego California Drunk Driving and DUI criminal defense lawyers .

Barkley will serve five days in jail, must enter an alcohol awareness program and was fined more than $2,000. Under Arizona law, he'll also be forced to install an ignition interlock device on his vehicles. He starts serving his sentence March 21.

Barkley, 45, had a blood-alcohol level of .149 percent, nearly twice the legal limit of .08 percent in Arizona when he was pulled over.

Barkley took a six-week leave of absence from his job with TNT but returned recently after apologizing for the incident.

"I think that a DUI is unacceptable," he added. "That can't happen and I've got to challenge other people, not just celebrities or jocks. You have to really think before getting behind the wheel after you've been drinking."

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San Diego DUI & DMV Defense Lawyer Specialist Rick Mueller is a Top-Rated San Diego County Drunk Driving, DUI & DMV Defense attorney with over 25 years of experience.
Known as the "DMV Guru," Rick Mueller dedicates 100% of his law practice to aggressively defending those accused of driving under the influence of alcohol. He has successfully saved the driving privileges of many clients in the past year alone. San Diego California Criminal Defense Attorney Rick Mueller recently spoke at the California Attorneys For Criminal Justice annual DUI seminar in Rancho Mirage, California: http://www.cacj.org/Events/forms/DUI%20Brochure%20Final.pdf . The California criminal defense lawyers who attended informed the President of the California DUI Lawyers Association that San Diego California DUI criminal defense attorney Rick Mueller was very helpful. Complete the important Free San Diego County Drunk Driving Defense Survey to find out your best strategy and to protect your driving privileges in California.

For more information or to contact a reasonable San Diego DUI Lawyer

San Diego DUI criminal defense lawyers report San Diego drunk driving police reported that a San Diego DUI law enforcement checkpoint on the island side of the San Diego-Coronado Bridge resulted in the arrests of 11 suspected San Diego DUI drunk drivers and 28 vehicles being impounded.

The San Diego drunk driving checkpoint operation wrapped up early today, but the names of those arrested - including those with out of state licenses - were unavailable, according to San Diego DUI criminal defense attorneys .
Three people were booked on suspicion of possessing marijuana, San Diego drunk driving defense attorneys report.

Police impounded 28 vehicles from people without valid licenses. San Diego drunk driving officers from Chula Vista, Coronado, National City and San Diego participated in the San Diego drunk driving crackdown, as did sheriff's San Diego drunk driving deputies.

Simply complete the Free San Diego California DUI Evaluation for your best San Diego California DUI defense attorney strategy and to vigorously protect your important driving privilege, as has been done for many good people who necessarily become San Diego California DUI Clienys..

See the below for more information about a San Diego DUI Lawyer.

Criminal (Misdemeanor) Sentences for
Driving Under the Influence of alcohol
and/or drugs (Vehicle Code Section 23152)


OFFENSE MINIMUM AND MAXIMUM SENTENCES WHEN PROBATION IS GRANTED MINIMUM AND MAXIMUM SENTENCES WITHOUT PROBATION WITH OR WITHOUT PROBATION
FIRST OFFENSE
within 10 years Attendance at an alcohol/drug program, a fine of $390 to $1,000, plus substantial, mandatory penalty assessments (totalling up to an additional 280% apx.), plus either (A) 48 hours to 6 months jail and 10 months license suspension; or (B) a license restriction to and from work, during work and to and from DUI program following any DMV suspension (if no refusal). 96 hours to 6 months in jail, $390 to $1,000 fine, and a 10-month license suspension. May impound vehicle for 6 months.
Up to 3 years ignition interlock device (IID), and Additional Jail if Child Passenger, if 30 mph over speed limit on freeway or if 20 mph over speed limit on other roads, if Refusal of chemical test, or if .15% BAC or more.

SECOND OFFENSE
within 10 years Attendance at 18-30 month alcohol/drug program, a fine of $390 to $1,000 plus substantial, mandatory penalty assessments, 96 hours to 1 year in jail, installation of ignition interlock (IID) device for up to 3 years, and 2 year license suspension, with a possible license restriction to and from work, during work and to and from DUI program after 1 year of suspension and completion of DUI program. However, your license shall be suspended if the offense occurred in a vehicle which requires a class 1, 2, A or B license. 90 days to 1 year in jail, $390 to $1,000 fine plus substantial, mandatory penalty assessments, IID up to 3 years, and 2 year license suspension.
THIRD OFFENSE
within 10 years 120 days to 1 year in jail, $390 to $1,000 fine plus substantial, mandatory penalty assessments, a 3-year license revocation, and an 18-month alcohol/drug program if you have not completed one before. 120 days to 1 year in jail, $390 to $1,000 fine, and a 3-year license revocation.
FOURTH OR SUBSEQUENT OFFENSE
within 10 years 120 days to 1 year in jail, $390 to $1,000 fine plus substantial, mandatory penalty assessments, a 4-year license revocation, and an 18-month alcohol/drug program if you have not completed one before. 16 months, or 2 or 3 years in state prison, or 180 days to 1 year in county jail; $390 to $1,000 fine, and a 4-year license revocation.


DMV Penalties for Driving Under the Influence of alcohol and/or drugs
OFFENSE BAC/REFUSAL SENTENCE
FIRST OFFENSE .08 or greater 4-month suspension
" " Refusal 1 year suspension
SECOND OFFENSE
within 10 years .08 or greater 1 year suspension
" " Refusal 2 year revocation
THIRD OFFENSE
within 10 years .08 or greater 3 year revocation
" " Refusal 3 year revocation
FOURTH OFFENSE
within 10 years .08 or greater 4 year revocation
" " Refusal 4 year revocation


DMV Suspension if .01% while on Probation
DMV shall immediately suspend the privilege of a person to operate a motor vehicle: ...if the person was on probation for Vehicle Code Section 23152 or 23153, and the person blows .01% or more, as measured by a preliminary alcohol screening test or other chemical test.


Driving on a Suspended License Mandatory Jail Penalty
If you drive when your privilege is suspended or revoked for driving under the influence of
alcohol, upon a first conviction, you face imprisonment in the county jail for not less than
10 days or more than six months and by a fine of not less than $300 nor more than $1,000.
[California Vehicle Code section 14601.2(a)]

San Diego DUI lawyers and San Diego drunk driving defense attorneys remind the public of differences between "drunk" or "DUI" as opposed to "tired" in California!

The California Highway Patrol says the driver of a casino-bound charter bus was falling asleep before the bus crashed last October, killing 10 people.

The CHP has delivered its 930-page report to the Colusa County district attorney, who will decide whether to bring criminal charges against the driver, 52-year-old Quintin Watts.

The CHP mistakenly arrested Watts on suspicion of California DUI - driving under the influence after the bus overturned on a two-lane road. However, toxicology reports released in October showed Watts was not DUI, drunk or on drugs.

Many of the 42 passengers heading to Colusa Casino Resort were Laotian seniors.

State investigators refused to discuss the report Friday. Colusa District Attorney John Poyner said the report indicates that Watts had had little sleep in the previous two days and witnesses reported seeing him nodding off moments before the wreck.

The owner of the bus was among those killed and many of the 42 passengers heading to Colusa Casino Resort were Laotian seniors.

Watts told his family that he had been training to drive a bus, and the day of the crash was his first one behind the wheel.

Officials in Poyner's office did not know when a final decision on charges would be reached.

Critical SAN DIEGO DUI "EVALUATION FORM"Quality San Diego DMV - DUI legal representation: 1-800-THE-LAW-DUI
(1-800-843-5293)

Find a Quality San Diego DUI Lawyer

San Diego DUI criminal defense lawyers at and San Diego drunk driving criminal defense attorneys learned today that birthday boy, former NBA Star Charles Barkley called his DUI / drunken-driving arrest "unacceptable" as he appeared again his television job after a six-week leave of absence.

The former 76er had a blood-alcohol level of .149 percent, nearly twice the legal DUI limit of .08 percent in Arizona, after he was arrested Dec. 31 in Scottsdale, police said.

Barkley resumed his role as studio analyst for TNT last night, one day before his 46th birthday.

"This is just my bad, no excuses," Barkley said in an interview with TNT colleague Ernie Johnson posted on NBA.com yesterday.

Barkley came back to the TNT "Inside The NBA" show Thursday night for the first time in nearly two months and he was mostly just Charles, maybe biting his lip a little but also accepting blame for his arrest in December for driving under the influence.

"Let me start by saying something," Barkley said as TNT came on the air before the San Antonio at Detroit game.

"Clearly everybody knows I got a DUI. That's unacceptable, 100% my fault," he said. " . . . I screwed up, I made a mistake, I'm sorry, I apologize."

There it was, nothing awkward and also a little bit in your face, just as Barkley usually conducts his business, good or bad.

"Never get behind the wheel when I've been drinking," Barkley said to anchor Ernie Johnson who asked what lessons Barkley may have learned from his DUI episode in December that caused Barkley to be arrested.

"First of all, every person who's drunk thinks it's OK to drive . . . but, seriously, if you have a drink, seriously think about it. If I've had a glass of wine or a beer, that's different. But if I had something to drink, I'll seriously think and not get behind the wheel."

There was the Everyman in Barkley. No one will take his advice if he says everyone who has a glass of wine or a beer shouldn't drive. Maybe not the most well-considered words from someone whose drunk-driving arrest has been so notable, but Barkley-honest.

He also thanked TNT management, kind of. "As far as the bigwigs at TNT, I never trusted them 110%," Barkley said. "I've been here eight years and we don't spend a lot of time together . . . but I want to tell them it meant a great deal for them to stick by me through my screw-up."

Barkley had already done an interview with Johnson, posted on NBA.com, and said his legal case was still in the system, that it was possible he might face jail time and most certainly would have to undergo some sort of alcohol counseling. Johnson asked Barkley if that was necessary.

"Well," Barkley said, "I think it's going to be good for me, to be honest. I need to make sure drinking is not a problem for me. I just want some professionals to talk to me about it."

That was it. Back to basketball and to a better show. Barkley is what makes the show pop. And if Barkley's lessons aren't well-learned, as he said, the world will know. Those camera phones are everywhere.

San Diego's DUI & DMV online consultation San Diego Drunk Driving Defense Resource Center:
San Diego DUI Lawyer Rick Mueller, a San Diego Drunk Driving / DWI Defense Attorney handling San Diego California DUI & DMV cases, shows how a Top-Rated San Diego DUI Lawyer will help you.

San Diego California DUI attorneys are often asked by San Diego drunk driving clients if the judge in a trial can punish the person more for going to trial?

San Diego California DUI Judges often give San Diego California DUI defendants harsher sentences when a defendant goes to San Diego California DUI trial and loses. But this San Diego California DUI penalty practice is clearly prohibited by the case law:

“In our opinion a defendant who pleads not guilty and avails himself of the right to trial cannot be said to have presented a frivolous or bad faith defense even though he presented no evidence on his behalf or, if he presents evidence, even though such presentation is without merit. ‘A defendant in a criminal action is presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved, and in case of a reasonable doubt whether his guilt is satisfactorily shown, he is entitled to an acquittal, . . .’ (§ 1096; See People v. Wells, 33 Cal.2d 330, 346 [202 P.2d 53].) This presumption must be weighed by the trier of fact along with all other evidence in arriving at a verdict or decision, and where the facts in the case are doubtful the presumption is sufficient to turn the scales in favor of an acquittal." (People v. Hill, 77 Cal.App.2d 287, 293 [175 P.2d 45].)

Accordingly, the presumption of innocence not only exists at the inception of the trial but continues throughout the (San Diego California DUI) trial to the conclusion thereof. (People v. Fitzgerald, 14 Cal.App.2d 180, 195-196 [58 P.2d 718]; People v. Barquera, 154 Cal.App.2d 513, 517 [316 P.2d 641]; People v. O'Brien, 106 Cal. 104, 105 [39 P. 325].) It is apparent, therefore, that the presumption of innocence in criminal law carries with it a "built in" defense which negates frivolity or bad faith since, unless it is overcome by proof of guilt to a moral certainty and beyond a reasonable doubt, this presumption is sufficient, in and of itself, to acquit a defendant. (See People v. Yeager, 194 Cal. 452, 486 [229 P. 40].)

We point out, furthermore, that the right of a defendant in a criminal case to rely upon the presumption of innocence is recognized by the emphasis given a defendant as to his concomitant right not to testify. Accordingly, comment by the prosecution on the accused's silence or instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of guilt is forbidden as violative of the Fifth Amendment of the federal Constitution. (Grffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 [14 L.Ed.2d 106, 85 S.Ct. 1229].)

In sum, and in view of the foregoing, we think it is clear that by increasing the penalty in the case of a defendant who chooses to rely on the presumption of innocence, to put the state to the test of proving its case, and to assert his right to a jury trial, one is in effect penalizing a defendant who asserts rights to which he is entitled. (See 66 Yale L.J. 204, 217-218, 221-222.)”See People v. Morales, 252 Cal. App. 2d 537, 546 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967)

“...there can be no question but that an accused cannot be punished by a more [*937] severe sentence because he has unsuccessfully exercised his constitutional right to stand trial rather than to plead guilty.” See Baker v. United States, 412 F.2d 1069, 1073 (5th Cir. 1969) and Weathington v. Wainwright, 486 F. Supp. 934, 937 (S.D. Fla. 1979)

“It is well settled that to punish a person for exercising a constitutional right is ‘a due process violation of the most basic sort.’ The constitutional right to trial by jury in criminal prosecutions is fundamental to our system of justice ; thus, [our Supreme Court has] stated that ‘only the most compelling reasons can justify any interference, however slight, with an accused's prerogative to personally decide whether to stand trial or to waive his rights by pleading guilty.’ ‘A court may not offer any inducement in return for a plea of guilty or nolo contendere. It may not treat a defendant more leniently because he foregoes his right to trial or more harshly because he exercises that right.’” See In re Lewallen, (1979) 23 Cal.3d 274, 278–279 [152 Cal. Rptr. 528, 590 P.2d 383 and In re Edy D., 120 Cal. App. 4th 1199, 1202 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2004).

If you have been arrested or cited for a DUI or drunk driving offense that occurred in the San Diego area, you need the best San Diego DUI attorney available to defend your San Diego drunk driving case.



An experienced San Diego DUI criminal defense attorney will provide the most thorough investigation and professional handling of your case from start to finish. With a goal to protect your legal rights and reduce penalties to the minimum, you San Diego DUI criminal defense lawyer will keep you advised every step of the way.



In order to properly defend your San Diego DUI case and give you the best chance to get back to your life, it is important to seek San Diego DUI legal representation immediately.



Retaining top San Diego drunk driving legal representation will ensure any necessary bail posting as soon as possible to reduce initial San Diego jail time.



The best San Diego DUI defense attorney will investigate all San Diego drunk driving arrests to ensure that the client’s legal rights were preserved and the San Diego county police officer following proper San Diego procedure.



If your San Diego DUI criminal lawyer identifies an illegal action or misconduct by the San Diego police officer, it could be grounds for San Diego DUI case dismissal.



However, if all proper San Diego procedures were followed - an unlikely event - your San Diego DUI attorney will nonetheless defend your San Diego drunk driving case to the most professional extent.



A first San Diego DUI / drunk driving offense is the best opportunity for your San Diego DUI defense lawyer to vigorously defend and to request a reduced San Diego DUI sentencing.



A premier San Diego DUI attorney will be one with over 24 years of experience and expertise in San Diego California drunk driving cases. Excellent San Diego court outcomes and satisfied clients will also be illustrative of the talent of your San Diego DUI / drunk driving criminal attorney.



San Diego DUI law firms provide free initial consultation to learn more about your case. To find the best San Diego DUI criminal defense lawyer, you can read more -Why use San Diego County's Specialist in DUI and DMV Law Or try a Free California DUI Evaluation.

San Diego DUI criminal defense attorneys and San Diego drunk driving criminal defense lawyers talk about Chris Rock's brother.

All of Us’ star Tony Rock was arrested on Wednesday in Los Angeles after cops busted him for driving under the influence of alcohol.The 34-year-old comic, who is the younger brother of comedian/actor Chris Rock, was put in jail at 2:40 a.m. after California Highway Patrol pulled him over for speeding on California’s 101 Freeway.
Authorities claim Rock showed signs of intoxication and police had him take a sobriety test that he failed. The comic was then charged with a DUI. The New York native paid $5,000 bail and was released. Most recently, Rock stars on ‘The Tony Rock Project’ on MyTV Network and has had a recurring role on the sitcom based off his family, ‘Everybody Hates Chris.’

San Diego DUI lawyers and San Diego Drunk Driving attorneys report as the State legislature struggles to solve a $42 billion deficit, the California Office of Traffic Safety (OTS) recently awarded the Contra Costa County Probation Department a grant of $620,115 to pay for the supervision of felony DUI offenders on probation.

This money will be used to pay the salaries for two probation officers for two years, and other administration costs, according to Probation Supervisor Laurie Barnes.

“I don’t have a breakdown on exactly how the money will be spent,” Barnes told the Gazette last week. “But the majority of the grant is probably going to pay for [the] salaries and particulars such as drug testing, overtime and training.”

Each earning at least $125,000 per year, the two probation officers will each have a caseload of about 50 people who are on parole for DUI.

“Intensified supervision will include random urinalysis tests, breath tests and unannounced visits to the home of the offender, along with special enforcement operations in conjunction with local law enforcement agencies,” said Barnes.

“The probation officers see the offenders twice a month.”

“We’re happy that the Contra Costa County Probation Department continues to target the worst-of-the-worst,” said Christopher J. Murphy, Director of the OTS. “These repeat offenders need the supervision this grant facilitates, keeping themselves and everyone else safer on our roadways.”

“Intensive supervision by these deputies through increased contacts, home searches, and drug and alcohol use testing protocols will help ensure these offenders adhere to compliance levels of their court orders and in abstaining from the use of alcohol,” according to the County’s Web site DUI page.

The DUI Enforcement Program has been in place in Contra Costa County since 2006. County data demonstrating the effectiveness of the program to date is unavailable, but statewide, persons killed in alcohol-involved collisions increased marginally from 1,769 in 2005 to 1,779 in 2006, according to the California Office of Traffic Safety reports

However, the OTS also states in its most recent California Traffic Safety Report Card, “Alcohol related fatalities dropped 8.3 percent from 1,762 in 2006 to 1,616 in 2007 – first year to year decrease since 1997-98, Alcohol Impaired Driving Fatalities (fatalities in crashes involving a least one driver or motorcycle operator with a Blood Alcohol Content (BAC) of 0.08 or greater) decreased 9.5 percent from 1,276 in 2006 to 1,155 in 2007 - represents California’s first year to year reduction since 1997-98, and statewide DUI arrests increased 3.4 percent from 197,248 in 2006 to 203,866 in 2007 – represents the most DUI arrests since 1994, according to the California Department of Justice.

Receiving more than four DUI convictions in a ten-year span constitutes felony probation, and officers “holds offenders accountable by enforcing court orders and through supervision in the community,” said Barnes in a prepared press release issued this month.

“We continue to be concerned by the high number of DUI cases in the County, especially repeat offenders,” said County Probation Officer Lionel Chatman. “It appears that many of these individuals have not gotten the message about drinking and driving. This funding will allow the department to focus more resources on the problem.”

The Office of Traffic Safety also granted the California Highway Patrol $6,394,983.00 for their 2009 Sobriety Checkpoint Operations and Roving DUI Enforcement (SCORE).

San Diego DUI lawyers noted San Diego Chargers wide receiver Vincent Jackson pleaded not guilty Tuesday to two charges of driving under the influence.

A readiness hearing was set for March 23 in San Diego County Superior Court.

Jackson's San Diego DUI criminal defense attorney entered the plea.

Jackson, on probation from a 2006 DUI conviction, faces charges of driving under the influence of alcohol and-or drugs and driving with a blood alcohol level of 0.08 percent or higher.

Jackson was arrested on Jan. 6, five days before the Chargers were eliminated from the playoffs by the eventual Super Bowl champion Pittsburgh Steelers.

Chargers defensive tackle Jamal Williams was arrested on suspicion of DUI on Feb. 1.

Complete the important Free San Diego County Drunk Driving Defense Survey to find out your best strategy and to protect your driving privileges in California.
For more information or to contact a San Diego DUI Lawyer who can help

San Diego DUI Lawyer Rick Mueller can make you laugh or he can help you beat the San Diego DUI officer and San Diego drunk driving charge
Q. What is one of the best possible things you San Diego DUI drivers can do to help to stop San Diego DUI Police from making so many San Diego drunk driving arrests?



The San Diego DUI answer comes from our lucky friends across the ocean.



From the State where drink driving is considered a sport, comes a true
story from Carrick-on-Suir Ireland.



Recently a routine Gardai patrol parked outside a local neighbourhood
tavern. Late in the evening the Garda noticed a man leaving the bar so
intoxicated that he could barely walk.



The man stumbled around the car park for a few minutes, with the Garda
quietly observing.



After what seemed an eternity and trying his keys on five vehicles, the man
managed to find his car which he fell into. He was there for a few minutes
as a number of other patrons left the bar and drove off.



Finally he started the car, switched the wipers on and off (it was a fine
dry night), flicked the indicators on, then off, tooted the horn and then
switched on the lights.



He moved the vehicle forward a few cm, reversed a little and then remained
stationary for a few more minutes as some more vehicles left.



At last he pulled out of the car park and started to drive slowly down the
road.



The Garda, having patiently waited all this time, now started up the patrol
car, put on the flashing lights, promptly pulled the man over and carried
out a Breathalyzer test.



To his amazement theBreathalyzer indicated no evidence of the man having
consumed alcohol at all!



Dumbfounded, the Garda said "I'll have to ask you to accompany me to the
Police station this Breathalyzer equipment must be broken."



"I doubt it," said the man, "tonight I'm the designated decoy".



True story...











Click on below sites for more information or to contact a San Diego DUI Lawyer

Tinting is illegal per se but the law allows glazing.

Federal standards:

Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 205 (49 C.F.R. 571.205), including the specified minimum light transmittance of 70 percent and the abrasion resistance of AS-14 glazing, as specified in that federal standard.

State standards:

In CA, the law says:

Devices utilizing transparent material shall be green, gray, or a neutral smoke in color and shall have a luminous transmittance of not less than 35 percent.

Sun screening devices meeting the requirements of Section 26708.2 installed on the side windows on either side of the vehicle'sfront seat, if the driver or a passenger in the front seat has inhis or her possession a letter or other document signed by a licensed physician and surgeon certifying that the person must be shaded fromthe sun due to a medical condition, or has in his or her possession, a letter or other document signed by a licensed optometrist certifying that the person must be shaded from the sun due to avisual condition. The devices authorized by this paragraph shall not be used during darkness.

People v. Beltran (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 235 [-- Cal.Rptr.3d --]

[No. A116944.

First Dist., Div. Four.

Nov. 27, 2007.]

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. OSCAR ADRIAN BELTRAN, Defendant
and Appellant.

(Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco, No. 2203403,
Kathleen Kelly, Judge.)

(Opinion by Ruvolo, P. J., with Sepulveda, J., and Rivera, J., concurring.)

COUNSEL

Lauretta Marie Oravitz-Komlos, by Appointment of the Court of Appeal
Under The First District Appellate Project's Assisted Case System, for
Appellant

Edmund G. Brown Jr., Attorney General of the State of California, Dane
R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Martin S. Kaye, Supervising Deputy Attorney
General, Christopher W. Grove, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent
{Page 157 Cal.App.4th 238}

OPINION

RUVOLO, P. J.-

I. INTRODUCTION

Appellant Oscar Adrian Beltran (appellant) was convicted by a jury of
driving under the influence of alcohol (count one) and driving with a
blood-alcohol content (BAC) of 0.08 percent or more (count two) (Veh.
Code, § 23152, subds. (a), (b), respectively) . He appeals only from the
conviction on count two, contending that the trial court erred by
instructing the jury with CALJIC No. 12.61.1. This instruction allowed
the jury to infer that appellant had a BAC of at least 0.08 percent
while he was driving if a blood-alcohol test administered within three
hours of the time he stopped driving revealed a BAC of 0.08 percent or more.

We reject appellant's broad claim that it is improper to instruct a jury
as to a permissive inference whenever there is evidence introduced at
trial that rebuts the inference. However, we agree with appellant that,
based on the evidence presented at trial, there was no rational
connection between the proved fact and the fact to be inferred
sufficient to justify giving CALJIC No. 12.61.1. Because the error was
prejudicial, we reverse the conviction as to count two. fn. 1

II. PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUNDS

On February 6, 2005, at approximately 3:00 a.m., appellant was stopped
by a California Highway Patrol officer for speeding and weaving between
lanes. The officer smelled a strong odor of alcohol emanating from
inside appellant's car, and appellant admitted that he drank a "couple
of beers" earlier that evening. At about 3:15 a.m., the officer
proceeded to administer a number of field sobriety tests. Appellant's
performance on these tests indicated to the officer that he was intoxicated.

Appellant agreed to take a roadside breath test using a Preliminary
Alcohol Screening (PAS) device. Two PAS tests were administered at 3:46
a.m. and 3:48 a.m., respectively, and both recorded a BAC of 0.08
percent. At trial, the parties stipulated that these PAS tests results
were reliable. Upon his arrival at the police station, and after the
required 15-minute observation period, {Page 157 Cal.App.4th 239}
appellant submitted two additional breath samples for further
blood-alcohol screening using an intoxilyzer device. The results of both
of these tests, the first taken at 4:12 a.m., indicated a BAC of 0.10
percent.

On February 8, 2005, appellant was charged with three misdemeanor
violations: driving under the influence of alcohol (Veh. Code, § 23152,
subd. (a); count one), driving with a BAC of 0.08 percent or more (Veh.
Code, § 23152, subd. (b); count two), and driving with a suspended
license (Veh. Code, § 14601.1, subd. (a); count three). The matter
proceeded to a jury trial during which the court granted appellant's
motion for judgment of acquittal on count three.

As to count two, both parties presented expert testimony which suggested
that appellant's BAC was below the legal limit at the time he was
driving. The prosecution' s expert witness, criminalist Lois Woodworth,
hypothesized that, assuming the reliability of the earlier PAS test
results, appellant's BAC was around 0.068 percent when he was stopped.
When the results of the intoxilyzer tests were considered, Woodworth
estimated that appellant's BAC would have been within the range of 0.068
to 0.095 percent when he was stopped. fn. 2

The defense expert, forensic toxicologist Kenneth Mark, estimated that
appellant had a BAC of 0.06 percent when he was stopped, assuming the
reliability of both the PAS tests and the later intoxilyzer tests. He
furthermore disagreed with the upper end of the range presented by
Woodworth, because it would require appellant's BAC to decrease and then
to increase again over a short period of time without further alcohol
consumption.

At the conclusion of the evidence, the court instructed the jury using
CALJIC No. 12.61.1, which provides as follows: "If the evidence
establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) a sample of defendant's
blood, breath or urine was obtained within three hours after he operated
a vehicle and (2) that a chemical analysis of the sample establishes
that there was 0.08 percent or more, by weight, of alcohol in the
defendant's blood at the time of the performance of the chemical test,
then you may, but are not required to, infer that the defendant drove a
vehicle with 0.08 percent by weight, of alcohol in the blood at the time
of the alleged offense." {Page 157 Cal.App.4th 240}

The record indicates that the jury returned with a question regarding
the instruction' s reference to the three-hour time period in CALJIC No.
12.61.1. fn. 3 The jury resumed its deliberations, and thereafter
returned a verdict convicting appellant as to both counts one and two.

On September 15, 2005, the trial court suspended imposition of sentence
and placed appellant on three years' probation. Appellant filed a notice
of appeal on October 13, 2005. On February 2, 2007, the appellate
division of the San Francisco Superior Court affirmed appellant's
convictions but remanded the matter to the trial court for resentencing.
The appellate division also denied appellant's subsequent petition for
rehearing and to transfer the appeal to this court. We granted
appellant's petition for transfer filed directly with the Court of
Appeal on March 15, 2007.

III. DISCUSSION
A. CALJIC No. 12.61.1 May Properly Be Given Where There Is Evidence
Presented That Rebuts the Permissive Inference fn. 4

[1] In order to convict appellant of violating Vehicle Code section
23152, subdivision (b), the prosecution must prove that (1) appellant
drove a vehicle and (2) when driving, his BAC was 0.08 percent or more.
As noted, CALJIC No. 12.61.1 permits the jury to infer that appellant
drove a vehicle with a BAC of 0.08 percent or more if a breath sample
taken within three hours of driving records a BAC of 0.08 percent or more.

Appellant contends on appeal that CALJIC No. 12.61.1 may not be given
where there is evidence admitted at trial that rebuts the inference. If
such evidence is presented by either party, "the trier of fact shall
determine the existence or nonexistence of the presumed fact from the
evidence and without regard to the presumption. " (Evid. Code, § 604.)
Unless treated this way, appellant argues that the instruction lowers
the prosecution' s burden of producing evidence, and shifts that burden
improperly to the defendant. {Page 157 Cal.App.4th 241}

The permissive inference allowed by CALJIC No. 12.61.1 originally
derived from a mandatory rebuttable presumption contained in Vehicle
Code section 23152, subdivision (b), and in section 604 of the Evidence
Code. fn. 5 Section 604 states: "a presumption affecting the burden of
producing evidence is to require the trier of fact to assume the
existence of the presumed fact unless and until evidence is introduced
which would support a finding of its nonexistence, in which case the
trier of fact shall determine the existence or nonexistence of the
presumed fact from the evidence and without regard to the presumption.
Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the drawing of any
inference that may be appropriate. " (Evid. Code, § 604, italics added.)

In People v. Roder (1983) 33 Cal.3d 491 (Roder) our Supreme Court
considered an instruction containing mandatory, directive language given
in the prosecution of a used goods dealer for receiving stolen property.
In Roder, the jury was instructed that, if it found the foundational
facts to be true, it " ' . . . shall presume [guilty knowledge] unless
from all the evidence you have reasonable doubt. . . .' " (Id. at p.
496.) The Roder court concluded that this mandatory, rebuttable
presumption limited the jury's freedom to assess independently all of
the prosecution evidence in order to determine whether the facts of the
particular case establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore,
the Roder court held that a jury instruction phrased as a rebuttable
presumption in a criminal case was unconstitutional. (Id. at p. 498.)

Roder also explained that this constitutional infirmity does not infect
jury instructions permitting the jury to draw permissive inferences:
"[A] carefully drafted instruction which places the inference in context
and does no more than inform the jury that upon the prosecution' s proof
of the four basic facts it is permitted--but not required--to infer
guilty knowledge is fairly innocuous, for even without such an
instruction a jury could, of course, reasonably infer that a secondhand
dealer who fails to make reasonable inquiry when obtaining stolen
property under suspicious circumstances knew that the property was
stolen." (Roder, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 506.) Furthermore, permissive
inferences "enable the court to inform the jury of an inference which
the Legislature- -drawing on its general experience-- has concluded can
often reasonably be drawn from proof of the basic facts." (Id. at p. 507.)

[2] Our Supreme Court commented on the presumption/ inference dichotomy
more recently in People v. McCall (2004) 32 Cal.4th 175. {Page 157
Cal.App.4th 242} " ' "Permissive presumptions" are not really
presumptions at all. Instead, they are simply inferences drawn from
evidence. They do not shift the prosecution' s burden of production, and
the jury is not required to abide by them. An instruction about a
"permissive presumption" is really an instructed inference.' " (Id. at
p. 183, fn. 5.)

West's Committee on California Criminal Jury Instructions (the CALJIC
Committee) amended CALJIC No. 12.61.1 in 1983 to provide only for a
permissive inference. The phrase " ' "should find" ' " was replaced by "
' "may but are not required to infer" ' " leaving the trier of fact free
to draw or reject the inference. The CALJIC Committee made this change
believing it to be necessary to comply with the constitutional
principles enunciated in Roder. (People v. Milham (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d
487, 505.)

Despite this change, appellant claims that the permissive inference
allowed in CALJIC No. 12.61.1 is inapplicable, and the instruction
should not be given, if other evidence is admitted at trial that rebuts
the inference. In making this argument, he relies principally on People
v. Moore (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 933 (Moore). In Moore, the court held
that the language limiting the use of presumptions in Evidence Code
section 604 pertains as well to permissive inferences. fn. 6 (Id. at pp.
938-939.) Moore explained that because evidence was introduced at trial
contradicting the inference, "the presentation of the required evidence
places the issue before the jury for its determination based solely on
the evidence presented, without regard to the presumption [citation],
and without any reason to pinpoint a specific inference." (Id. at p.
939.) Therefore, Moore held that it was error for the trial court to use
CALJIC No. 16.152.

By parity of reasoning, appellant claims that because there was evidence
indicating that his BAC was below the legal limit at the time that he
was driving, the jury should not have been instructed with CALJIC No.
12.61.1. In addition to Moore, appellant refers us to the Judicial
Council's counterpart to CALJIC No. 12.61.1, jury instruction CALCRIM
No. 2111. Unlike CALJIC No. 12.61.1, in CALCRIM No. 2111 the paragraph
containing the permissive inference is bracketed. The Bench Notes to
CALCRIM No. 2111 explain that, to avoid the prohibition against
evidentiary presumptions criticized in Roder, that instruction was
drafted as permitting only a permissive inference. Nevertheless, in the
apparent belief that there was a need to conform this new {Page 157
Cal.App.4th 243} instruction to the limitation contained in Evidence
Code section 604, the Bench Notes further explain that "it is only
appropriate to instruct the jury on a permissive inference if there is
no evidence to contradict the inference. (Evid. Code, § 604.) If any
evidence has been introduced to support the opposite factual finding,
then the jury 'shall determine the existence or nonexistence of the
presumed fact from the evidence and without regard to the presumption. '
(Ibid.)" (CALCRIM No. 2111, Bench Notes, p. 146.) fn. 7

We agree with respondent that Moore and CALCRIM No. 2111 fail to
recognize the important legal distinction between mandatory presumptions
and permissive inferences. The holding in Moore is particularly puzzling
because the opinion specifically acknowledges that CALJIC No. 16.152 was
originally drafted as a mandatory rebuttable presumption, but had to be
changed to a permissive inference in order to conform to Roder. (Moore,
supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at pp. 937-938.) Accordingly, the Moore court
initially concluded that there was nothing "facially wrong" with the
revised instruction. (Id. at p. 936.)

However, Moore also cited the Use Note to CALJIC No. 16.152, which
erroneously retained language from the time when the instruction
provided for a mandatory rebuttable presumption: " 'Do not give this
instruction if evidence has been received tending to prove that the
failure to provide was not willful or was not without lawful excuse.' "
(CALJIC No. 16.152, Use Note, p. 1092.) From this the court then
concluded that as "the CALJIC Committee explains, the rebuttable
presumption created by [Penal Code] section 270 is a presumption
affecting the burden of producing evidence (People v. Sorensen (1968) 68
Cal.2d 280, 286-287), which means the presentation of the required
evidence places the issue before the jury for its determination based
solely on the evidence presented, without regard to the presumption
(Evid. Code, § 604) and without any reason to pinpoint a specific
inference. In this case, it was error to give CALJIC No. 16.152."
(Moore, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at pp. 938-939.) fn. 8 By so concluding,
the Moore court overlooked its earlier observation that the instruction
had been changed from a mandatory rebuttable presumption to a permissive
inference, and found error relying on principles which Roder makes clear
apply only to rebuttable presumptions. {Page 157 Cal.App.4th 244}

This appears to be the same error made by the drafters of CALCRIM No.
2111. Although the CALCRIM instruction, like CALJIC No. 12.61.1, now
provides only for a permissive inference, the Bench Notes retain the
cautionary language needed when the instruction had been cast as a
mandatory rebuttable presumption: "[I]t is only appropriate to instruct
the jury on a permissive inference if there is no evidence to contradict
the inference. (Evid. Code, § 604.) If any evidence has been introduced
to support the opposite factual finding, then the jury 'shall determine
the existence or nonexistence of the presumed fact from the evidence
and without regard to the presumption. ' (Ibid.)" (CALCRIM No. 2111,
Bench Notes, p. 146.)

[3] In summary, when used in appropriate cases, permissive inferences do
not shift the burden of production or lower the prosecution' s burden of
proof. Because they may or may not be drawn by the jury, they do not
operate in an unconstitutionally pernicious manner. For these reasons,
CALJIC No. 12.61.1 may be given regardless of whether there is other
evidence admitted at trial "rebutting" the inference. However, the use
of permissive inferences is not permitted in all cases. Therefore, we
must also consider whether the evidence in this case supported giving
CALJIC No. 12.61.1, and if not, what legal consequences attach to
erroneous giving of the instruction.

B. The Permissive Inference in CALJIC No. 12.61.1 Was Not
Rationally Connected to the Proven Fact, and It Was Prejudicial Error to
Give the Instruction in This Case

The seminal case discussing the legal limits on the use of permissive
inferences in criminal cases is Ulster, supra, 442 U.S. 140. That case
involved a prosecution brought against the driver and passengers of a
vehicle in which concealed weapons were found. Under New York law, the
jury was instructed that the presence of a weapon was "presumptive
evidence" of illegal possession by anyone in the vehicle. (Id. at p.
142.) fn. 9

[4] The Ulster decision begins by noting that a determination of whether
permissive inferences offend due process varies from case to case, and
turns on the ultimate test of whether use of the "device" undermines the
jury's responsibility to find the ultimate facts beyond a reasonable
doubt. (Id. at p. 156.) As to permissive inferences, the prosecution' s
burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is not improperly
shifted from the prosecution to the defense unless, "under the facts of
the case, there {Page 157 Cal.App.4th 245} is no rational way the trier
could make the connection permitted by the inference. For only in that
situation is there any risk that an explanation of the permissive
inference to a jury, or its use by a jury, has caused the presumptively
rational factfinder to make an erroneous factual determination. " (Id. at
p. 157; see also People v. James (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1343, 1356.)

Put in slightly different language, "[a]lthough such an instruction does
not shift the burden of proof, it violates due process 'if the suggested
conclusion is not one that reason and common sense justify in light of
the proven facts before the jury.' [(Francis v. Franklin (1984)] 471
U.S. at [pp. ]314-315 . . . (citing [Ulster], supra, 442 U.S. 140,
157-163); [United States v.] Washington [(9th Cir. 1987)] 819 F.2d
[221,] 225." (United States v. Warren (9th Cir. 1994) 25 F.3d 890, 897,
fn. omitted.)

The Ulster court then explained under what circumstances the "rational
connection" between the proven fact and the inferred fact must be
"beyond a reasonable doubt" and when that connection simply must be
"more likely than not." (Ulster, supra, 442 U.S. at pp. 165-167.) The
court reasoned that in most cases, the inference is merely one piece of
evidence the prosecution relies on to prove guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. In those instances, if the prosecution relies on a permissive
inference as evidence of the defendant's guilt, but offers other
evidence of the defendant's guilt, there need be only a "substantial
assurance that the presumed fact is more likely than not to flow from
the proved fact on which it is made to depend." (Id. at p. 166, fn. 28,
quoting Leary v. United States (1968) 395 U.S. 6, 36, italics added.)

However, when an inference is the "sole and sufficient" proof of an
element, the Supreme Court in Ulster determined that the reasonable
doubt standard would apply. (Ulster, supra, 442 U.S. at p. 167.) This
distinction makes sense. Where the permissive inference is the only
evidence offered by the prosecution to prove an essential element of the
offense, and the jury finds the defendant guilty, it necessarily follows
that the jury relied solely on the inference in order to convict.
Consequently, the presumed fact must follow from the proved fact beyond
a reasonable doubt.

In this case, the sole evidence upon which the jury could have concluded
that appellant had a BAC of 0.08 percent or greater when he was driving
was the inference of that fact from a blood-alcohol test administered
within three hours of driving that revealed a BAC of 0.08 percent or
greater at the time of the test. Under Ulster, because the permissive
inference was the sole evidence used to convict, the connection between
the proved fact and the inferred fact had to be established beyond a
reasonable doubt, in order to pass constitutional muster. {Page 157
Cal.App.4th 246}

[5] Here, the PAS tests administered at times significantly later than
when appellant was stopped, which the parties stipulated were reliable,
indicated a BAC of 0.08 percent. The later intoxilyzer tests showed a
BAC of 0.10 percent. Thus, while in isolation either the PAS tests or
the intoxilyzer tests were sufficient to allow for the inference
permitted by CALJIC No. 12.61.1, together they show that appellant's BAC
was rising from the time he was stopped until the intoxilyzer tests were
administered. This circumstance is a classic example of the
well-recognized defense in DUI cases known as the "rising blood-alcohol"
defense. (Helmandollar v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1992) 7
Cal.App.4th 52, 55; Taylor, California Drunk Driving Defense (3d ed.
2001) Forensic Chemist: Blood-Alcohol, § 11.1.1, pp. 610-611.)

The prosecution' s own expert testified concerning the effect of "rising
alcohol": "[R]ising alcohol basically means that a person's blood
alcohol concentration is increasing over time. And the defense part
comes in, in that perhaps if a test was done at some time or period
after the driving occurred, typically a longer period of time, like
let's say two hours, that possibly at the time of driving, the person's
actual BAC was below [0].08."

Additionally, both parties' expert witnesses hypothesized that, assuming
the reliability of the PAS test results, appellant's BAC was under 0.08
percent when he was driving. For example, the prosecution witness opined
that, based on the relationship between the time appellant was stopped
by police and the time of the PAS tests, those tests indicated that his
BAC at the time of driving was approximately 0.068 percent. If one looks
instead at the intoxilyzer tests administered at 4:12 a.m., that test
indicated that appellant's BAC at the time of driving was in the range
of 0.06 to 0.09 percent. fn. 10 However, the prosecutor's expert did not
explain how, if the two sets of tests were taken together, and in light
of his obviously rising BAC, appellant's BAC could have been 0.08
percent or higher 45 minutes before the first PAS test was administered.

To the contrary, appellant's expert opined that, if the two sets of
tests are considered together, then "clearly" appellant's BAC was below
0.08 percent when he was driving; probably in the order of 0.06 percent.
While it was "possible" that his BAC could have gone down for the PAS
tests, and then up again for the intoxilyzer tests, it was not a
reasonable conclusion in this case. {Page 157 Cal.App.4th 247}

During closing arguments, the prosecutor encouraged the jury to follow
CALJIC No. 12.61.1 and infer that appellant had a BAC of at least 0.08
percent based on either the PAS tests or the intoxilyzer tests. fn. 11
The argument did not attempt to explain the relationship between the two
sets of tests and their significance as to appellant's actual BAC while
he was driving.

Taken as a whole, the connection between the proved fact (test result
demonstrating a BAC of 0.08 percent or greater within three hours of
driving) and the inferred fact (BAC of 0.08 percent or greater at the
time of driving), which is an element of the charged crime, was not
established beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, instructing the jury
with CALJIC No. 12.61.1 was constitutional error that improperly lowered
the prosecution' s burden of proof. fn. 12

Both the United States and California Supreme Courts have held that the
Chapman test fn. 13 applies to appellate review involving challenges to
jury instructions relating to mandatory rebuttable presumptions, because
they diminish a defendant's right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt of
each element of the charged offense. (E.g., Carella v. California (1989)
491 U.S. 263, 267; Rose v. Clark (1986) 478 U.S. 570, 579-581.) In
People v. James (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1343, it was made clear that the
Chapman standard applies also to challenges to instructions erroneously
allowing permissive inferences. (Id. at pp. 1361-1362.) Respondent does
not argue otherwise. Therefore, "we proceed to consider whether it
appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to
[the] jury's verdict." (People v. Huggins (2006) 38 Cal.4th 175, 212.)

There is no reasonable doubt that in this case the jury relied on the
inference to convict. Indeed, as we have made abundantly clear already,
the permissive inference was the only evidence used to establish
appellant's guilt of a violation of Vehicle Code section 23152,
subdivision (b). Moreover, because appellant's BAC was rising after the
first test was administered, there was strong forensic evidence
indicating that appellant's blood-alcohol level was below 0.08 percent
when he was stopped by police. Without belaboring the matter further,
under these circumstances it cannot be said beyond a reasonable doubt
that the jury did not infer that appellant's BAC was at least {Page 157
Cal.App.4th 248} 0.08 percent, as erroneously instructed by CALJIC No.
12.61.1. Therefore, we reverse the conviction as to count two.

IV. DISPOSITION

Count two of the judgment is reversed. The judgment is affirmed in all
other respects.

Sepulveda, J., and Rivera, J., concurred.

­FN 1. Appellant also contends that, even absent the instructional
error, the jury's finding on count two was not supported by substantial
evidence. In light of our reversal for instructional error, we need not
address directly whether the evidence presented at trial met the
substantial evidence standard. (In re George T. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 620,
630-631.)

­FN 2. For purposes of evidentiary breath testing, the third digit of
the percentage test result reading is disregarded.

­FN 3. The jury's note is not part of the record on appeal, and the
information regarding its content is gleaned only from the trial court's
comment about it while the note was discussed with counsel in connection
with appellant's post-conviction motion for new trial.

­FN 4. As the United States Supreme Court has explained, "The most
common evidentiary device is the entirely permissive inference or
presumption, which allows-but does not require-the trier of fact to
infer the elemental fact from proof by the prosecutor of the basic one .
. . ." (Ulster County Court v. Allen (1979) 442 U.S. 140, 157 (Ulster).)
While courts have used the phrases "permissive inference" and
"permissive presumption" interchangeably, for clarity's sake we refer to
the "device" as a "permissive inference," the language employed in both
the CALJIC and CALCRIM jury instructions.

­FN 5. "In any prosecution under this subdivision, it is a rebuttable
presumption that the person had 0.08 percent or more, by weight, of
alcohol in his or her blood at the time of driving the vehicle if the
person had 0.08 percent or more, by weight, of alcohol in his or her
blood at the time of the performance of a chemical test within three
hours after the driving." (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (b).)

­FN 6. In Moore, the jury was instructed using CALJIC No. 16.152, as
follows: "If the evidence establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that the
parent of a child abandoned or deserted such child, or that the parent
omitted to furnish the necessary food, clothing, shelter or medical
attendance or other remedial care, you may infer that such omission was
willful and without lawful excuse." (Moore, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at p.
936, fn. 2.)

­FN 7. CALCRIM No. 2100 contains similar bracketed and Bench Notes
language regarding the permissive inference permitted under Vehicle Code
section 23610 (if defendant has BAC of .08 percent or higher at time of
test, it may inferred he was under the influence at the time of
driving). This instruction and its corresponding Bench Notes suffer from
the same infirmities as CALCRIM No. 2111, discussed post.

­FN 8. The Use Note to CALJIC No. 12.61.1 does not retain the same
unnecessary limitation on the use of the instruction formerly reserved
for mandatory rebuttable presumptions.

­FN 9. Under New York law, the three statutory exceptions to the
presumption were if: (1) the weapon was found on the person of one of
the occupants, (2) the vehicle was primarily for hire, and (3) one of
the occupants had a license to carry the weapon. (Ulster, supra, 442
U.S. at pp. 142-143, fn. 1.)

­FN 10. Even if one looked at the intoxilyzer results in isolation, and
the expert's resultant extrapolation to a BAC somewhere between 0.06 and
0.09 percent at the time of driving, it is questionable whether such
evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant's BAC was 0.08
percent or higher at the time of driving. While there was other evidence
that defendant was under the influence at the time of driving, our
review of the record reveals no expert testimony tying defendant's
objective symptoms of intoxication (weaving, speeding, odor of alcohol,
and performance on field sobriety tests) to any particular BAC.

­FN 11. In fact, the prosecutor tried to argue that the intoxilyzer
tests were more accurate than the PAS tests. Apparently based on the
stipulation of the reliability of the PAS tests by the parties, the
trial judge sustained a defense objection to the comment and ordered it
stricken.

­FN 12. Even if the "more likely than not" test were to apply here, we
would find that the prosecution' s evidence failed to rise to the level
required to make the inference reasonable.

­FN 13. Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18.

San Diego drunk driving criminal defense lawyers point out the .08% BAC law says that if you blow a .08 or higher, you can be in violation of this statute and be found GUILTY of this crime, sometimes irrespective of any other details regarding your case.

This is harsh if you consider that these machines are not particularly accurate in determining a person's BAC (blood alcohol content). Are these machines accurate and reliable? Consider the word of very learned and highly regarded experts in the field who have written numerous articles on these machines. In a nutshell, the machine utilizes a partition ratio (a formula) to calculate the ethanol that it senses on ones breath and to extrapolate out what it believes a person's blood alcohol content should be. The machine then spits out that number on a cash register sized piece of paper and you then have to fight the machine or be convicted of DUI.

The problem is that the machine utilizes a constant partition ration number of 2100:1 for all people. So the machine multiplies the parts of alcohol that it senses in the breath, it calculates that number by 2100 and it says the result is your BAC or blood alcohol content. Big, small, tall, short, male, female, black, white, Asian makes no difference the machine calculates 2100:1 partition ratio. Are all people made alike? Does the 6'8" NFL player have the same body makeup as the 5'2" soccer mom? I don't think so and either do the experts in the field.

The reality is that we all have different partition ratios that can range from as low as 1500:1 to as high as 2500:1 or higher. The machines however are programmed to take an average number of the average person. The problem is that we are all not average people, if we were we would all be 5'9" and 170lbs. So when the machine uses the wrong number, which does not match the partition ratio of the person tested there is a substantial chance that the number the machine yields will be erroneous; it could be erroneous by as much as 10-20% or more.

In addition to the foregoing, the method of the blow, or how you blow into the machine also has an impact on your number. There is a saying among those that work in field "the harder you blow, the higher you go" so when the breath test technician tells you to hold your breath and blow in the machine as hard as you can he is really saying "let's artificially maximize the number that you blow so that I can get an easier conviction in court."

The EC/IR machine requires a steady exhalation from the defendant which should last roughly 5 seconds in duration, the machine then measures the volume of ethanol in the trailing exhalation right before the volume of breath dissipates. If you hold your breath and blow as hard as you can, you are artificially maximizing the volume of ethanol exhaled into the machine from the deep lung which is then calculated at the partition ration as described above.

San Diego DUI Lawyer Rick Mueller, a San Diego Drunk Driving / DWI Defense Attorney handling San Diego California DUI & DMV cases, shows how a Top-Rated San Diego DUI Lawyer will help you.
San Diego DUI Lawyer - San Diego Attorney Drunk Driving can help you beat the San Diego drunk driving charge:
San Diego DUI Lawyer Rick Mueller, a San Diego Drunk Driving / DWI Defense Attorney handling San Diego California DUI & DMV cases, shows how a San Diego DUI Lawyer will help you.
FREE SAN DIEGO DUI & DMV DEFENSE "EVALUATION FORM"
San Diego DUI Defense Resource Center:
San Diego DUI Lawyer Rick Mueller, a San Diego Drunk Driving / DWI Defense Attorney handling San Diego California DUI & DMV cases, shows how a San Diego DUI Lawyer will help you.
San Diego DUI Lawyer Rick Mueller is a premier San Diego County Drunk Driving, DUI & DMV Defense attorney with over 25 years of experience. Known as a "DMV Guru," Rick Mueller dedicates 100% of his law practice to aggressively defending those accused of driving under the influence of alcohol. He has successfully saved the driving privileges of many clients in the past year alone. Complete the important Free San Diego County Drunk Driving Defense Survey to find out your best strategy and to protect your driving privileges in California.

San Diego DUI defense attorneys explain what you must do within 10 days of being arrested of a San Diego Drunk Driving charge:

10. If you need to save your driver's license or privileges, your San Diego DUI defense attorney has only ten (10) calendar days to contact DMV!



Do not schedule yourself. If you contact DMV to schedule a date conflicting with your San Diego DUI defense attorney's calendar, DMV will not reschedule and you may not get the San Diego DUI defense attorney of your choice. There is no rush as long as your San Diego DUI defense attorney contacts DMV by the 10th day from your arrest.



9. The ten (10) day time limit is computed from the Issue date of the SUSPENSION/REVOCATION ORDER AND TEMPORARY DRIVER LICENSE. If time is running out or you are late, contact an attorney ASAP.



8. This ADMINISTRATIVE PER SE SUSPENSION/REVOCATION ORDER AND TEMPORARY DRIVER LICENSE is the California DMV paper which you should have received.



7. Even if you did not receive this DMV paper, the California DMV will probably take action against your driving privileges.



6. Even if you have a license from another state, and even if the officer did not take your license, that state may also take action against your driving privileges.



5. This TEMPORARY DRIVER LICENSE ENDORSEMENT is valid for only thirty (30) days from the issue date.



If a DMV hearing is requested within ten (10) days, your DMV TEMPORARY will be extended & there will be a stay (delay) of any suspension until the outcome of your DMV hearing is determined.



4. Do not confuse this initial 30 day TEMPORARY DRIVER LICENSE with your court date!

The DMV and criminal proceedings are separate and independent. The outcome of one almost never affects the other. Sometimes the officer or the DMV paper confuses or misleads you to believe that the TEMPORARY DRIVER LICENSE is good "until the court date". If there are approximately thirty (30) days from your arrest date to your court date, this may just be a dangerous coincidence. There usually are months before your DMV hearing takes place.



3. There are three (3) issues at the hearing if you completed a chemical test. (See reverse side of DMV paper.)



Issues are whether the officer had probable cause to stop or contact you or whether the chemical test evidence is beatable.



2. The DMV has the burden of proof to prevail on all three (3) issues. If DMV meets the burden of proof on two (2) issues, you win!



1. All a San Diego DUI and DMV attorney has to do is knock out one (1) DMV issue to save your license & you avoid any reissue fee and/or Proof of Insurance SR-22 filing!






Click on below sites for more information or to contact a San Diego DUI Lawyer

san diego dui attorney,

DUI is a criminal offense in all 50 states. It’s often a misdemeanor offense, but can be a felony under certain conditions. Several prior convictions can mean a felony charge in most states and some states have terms that outline aggravating factors that can result in a misdemeanor charge being elevated to a felony charge. Some of the more prevalent aggravating factors are having an extremely high level of blood alcohol concentration, driving under the influence with a child in the vehicle, or causing property damage or serious bodily injuries while driving under the influence.

Many states have two ways in which a DUI case can be prosecuted. One of these is based on the physical impairment of the arrested individual. In this instance, the prosecutor focuses on trying to prove that you were too impaired to safely operate a vehicle at the time of the San Diego California drunk driving arrest.

Testimony may come from San Diego California law enforcement officials and focus on your appearance, performance of sobriety tests, driving behavior, and other factors that may show you shouldn’t have been driving. The second way is often known as the per se DUI theory. This is where the prosecutor will base his case on the results of chemical testing done at the time of your arrest.

If the test results show that your BAC exceeded the California legal BAC limit, then the San Diego California prosecutor can show that your were guilty of a San Diego California DUI even if you didn’t appear to be impaired.

Reviewing Administrative Penalties - In most states, you can lose your driving privileges if you are arrested for driving under the influence, even if you are eventually found not guilty of the charge. That doesn’t seem fair, does it?

Some states have an appeals process where you can appeal your suspension in writing and then get a hearing to determine the status of your driving privileges. If you don’t have a qualified, experienced San Diego California DUI lawyer to represent you during your appeal hearing, you may lose out on the opportunity to get a temporary license that you can use to drive until your date. This means you won't be able to get to work, drive yourself to medical and dental appointments, pick up your kids from school, or do any of your normal daily activities that require driving.

Since DUI is a criminal offense, there’s a wide range of criminal penalties available. In most states, these penalties can include jail time, fines, court costs, alcohol and drug education, alcohol treatment, ignition interlock device installation, community service and probation. The San Diego California sentencing will depend on a variety of factors, including the number of prior convictions, aggravating circumstances present in your case, and other circumstances. If you have a qualified San Diego California DUI attorney, he can speak on your behalf prior to your sentencing and ask that the court be as lenient as possible. If you have accumulated several San Diego California convictions, however, it is unlikely that you will be sentenced to anything other than the maximum San Diego California penalties allowed by law since you have broken the law several times.

Reviewing Benefits of a San Diego California DUI Attorney - You’ll gain many benefits when working with an attorney who specializes in San Diego California DUI defense. These benefits include better access to expert witnesses, more specialized knowledge of San Diego California DUI law, and more experience defending people charged with San Diego California DUI offenses. Going it alone or working with a public defender or non-specialist lawyer can mean you may not be getting the best possible defense. Choose to work with a San Diego California DUI attorney and you will have a much better chance of winning your case and being able to move on with your life.

San Diego California DUI Evaluation
San Diego California Criminal Defense Attorney Rick Mueller recently spoke at the California Attorneys For Criminal Justice annual DUI seminar in Rancho Mirage, California: http://www.cacj.org/Events/forms/DUI%20Brochure%20Final.pdf .

Click below sites to contact a San Diego DUI Lawyer can assistp>

San Diego DUI criminal lawyers and San Diego drunk driving defense attorneys report that the ignition interlock device system successfully worked when former major leaguer Jim Leyritz was arrested and jailed after a judge revoked his bond for violating his pretrial release on a DUI manslaughter charge.

Authorities say a system in Leyritz's car that he has to blow in before starting it, and periodically while driving, recorded that he consumed alcohol four times since the device was installed in April 2008. He is not allowed to drink alcohol under the terms of his release.

Leyritz's trial is tentatively set for May 25. If convicted, he faces up to 15 years in prison. Authorities said Leyritz was drunk on Dec. 28, 2007, when he ran a red light in Fort Lauderdale and crashed into another car, killing 30-year-old Fredia Ann Veitch.

San Diego's DUI & DMV online consultation reports the results of last night's California DUI checkpoint in Escondido, San Diego.

The Escondido Police Department conducted a DUI saturation patrol Friday night February 13, 2009 from 5:00 PM until 12:00 A.M. The emphasis of the saturation patrol was to detect and arrest intoxicated drivers as well as to enforce all traffic laws within the City.

The following activity resulted from this saturation patrol:

- 2 drivers were arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol / drugs
- 1 driver was arrested for giving false information to an officer
- 24 traffic citations were issued
- 5 vehicles were impounded for drivers who were arrested, did not have a driver license, or had their driving privilege suspended

This saturation patrol operated in conjunction with the San Diego County DUI Probation Team, and the San Diego County Sheriffs Department.

Funding for this program was provided by a grant from the California Office of Traffic Safety, through the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.

Drunk Driving Over the Limit Under Arrest, Report Drunk Drivers Call 911

San Diego Drunk Driving Defense Resource CenterSan Diego DUI Lawyer Rick Mueller, a San Diego Drunk Driving / DWI Defense Attorney handling San Diego California DUI & DMV cases, shows how a Top-Rated San Diego DUI Lawyer will help you.

San Diego DUI Lawyer - San Diego Attorney Drunk Driving can help you beat the San Diego drunk driving charge:
San Diego DUI Lawyer Rick Mueller, a San Diego Drunk Driving / DWI Defense Attorney handling San Diego California DUI & DMV cases, shows how a San Diego DUI Lawyer will help you.
FREE SAN DIEGO DUI & DMV DEFENSE "EVALUATION FORM"

San Diego DUI Defense Resource Center:

San Diego DUI Lawyer Rick Mueller, a San Diego Drunk Driving / DWI Defense Attorney handling San Diego California DUI & DMV cases, shows how a San Diego DUI Lawyer will help you.

San Diego DUI Lawyer Rick Mueller is a premier San Diego County Drunk Driving, DUI & DMV Defense attorney with over 25 years of experience. Known as a "DMV Guru," Rick Mueller dedicates 100% of his law practice to aggressively defending those accused of driving under the influence of alcohol. He has successfully saved the driving privileges of many clients in the past year alone. Complete the important Free San Diego County Drunk Driving Defense Survey to find out your best strategy and to protect your driving privileges in California.
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